

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW



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Past and Present

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Contributors To This Issue

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN, foreign correspondent in Soviet Russia for the *Christian Science Monitor*, 1922-1933, is the author of well-known works on the Soviet Union and international affairs.

GEORGE F. KENNAN, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, is Professor in the School of Historical Studies, The Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey, and author of *Russia Leaves the War*, 1956.

RICHARD HARE is lecturer at the School of Slavonic Studies, University of London and author of *Pioneers of Russian Social Thought*, Oxford, 1951.

FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN is Associate Professor of Political Science, Yale University, and author of *Soviet Russian Nationalism*, 1956.

ROBIN KEMBALL is pursuing his studies for the Ph.D. degree in Russian Literature at Basle University, Switzerland.

PAUL B. ANDERSON is Senior Secretary in Europe for the International Committee of YMCA and author of *People, Church, and State in Modern Russia*, 1944, and other works.

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THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

Dimitri von Mohrenschildt
Editor

William Henry Chamberlin
 Ralph T. Fisher, Jr.

Michael Karpovich
 Warren B. Walsh

Alexis Wiren

The purpose of *The Russian Review* is to interpret the real aims and aspirations of the Russian people, as distinguished from and opposed to Soviet Communism, and to advance general knowledge of Russian culture, history and civilization. The Review invites contributions by authors of divergent views, but the opinions expressed in any individual article of this journal are not necessarily those of the editors.

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Forty Years of Soviet Communism

By WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

FORTY years ago a small disciplined band of professional revolutionaries leaped into power over the vast Russian Empire on the crest of a wave of anarchical revolt and social collapse which swept over Russia after the fall of the Tsar. Soldiers had thrown off normal discipline, refused to fight and, in Lenin's phrase, were voting for peace with their legs—by running away. Workers were refusing to work, preferring to attend revolutionary meetings, organize them as "Red Guards," and prepare to take over the factories, for what purpose they hardly knew. The peasants were engaged in one of the greatest *Jacqueries* in history, taking advantage of the complete breakdown of law and order to seize the land and often loot and burn the homes of the landed gentry.

In this boiling caldron of social upheaval it was possible for the most extreme wing of the Russian Social Democratic Party to come into power on a program of slogans well adapted to the mood of the insurgent masses: "Peace. Bread. Land. All power to the Soviets. Equality for all. Down with secret treaties, militarism, imperialism."

Forty years later the heirs of Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin are ruling a society more tightly disciplined and regimented than Tsarist Russia ever was, a society in which inequality of rank and pay is the recognized rule, a society that is insured, as well as rigid police measures can insure against any wild anarchical revolt, from below and in which the utopian ideals of the founding fathers of Soviet Communism have been discarded and shelved. For it is one of the most curious anomalies of Soviet Communism on its fortieth anniversary that its successes have only been possible by putting aside traditional socialist and Communist theories.

What has become, for instance, of the 1917 slogan, "workers control of industry?" State-owned industries and factories are run by state-appointed managerial bureaucrats. Not only do the workers have no voice in the direction of the plants where they work; there is also no representation of their interests. The all-powerful Communist state has long taken over the trade-unions, thus creating a situation familiar under fascist regimes, where the unions, instead of representing the workers, are part of the general state apparatus.

Lenin's speeches in 1917 were full of demagogic appeals to the idea of complete material equality. "Rob what has been robbed," was one of his slogans, which mobs in and out of uniform were only too ready to translate into action. Looking forward to the future under Communism he predicted that "all society will be one office and one factory, with equality of labor and equality of pay." "Every cook must know how to manage the state" was the vivid way in which he phrased his demand that all citizens should take an active part in the management of public affairs.

And in the first phase of the new Soviet order there were some attempts to put the Communist doctrine of equality and class favoritism upside down into practice. The top salary which a member of the Communist Party might earn was set at a skilled worker's wage. Proletarian families were moved into the apartments of the well-to-do. The Hall of the Nobility in Moscow became the Hall of the Trade-Unions. The members of the new government called themselves not ministers but commissars.

Now, after four decades of erosion of the original single-minded fanatical idealism of the veteran Communists who were sincere in their faith, not a trace of this egalitarianism remains. The inequality of power which is implicit in dictatorship has led to inequality of wealth, of rank, of status. The workers, peasants, Soviet employees, the masses in whose name the Revolution was made, have no political function in the Soviet state except voting for the single list of candidates presented at Soviet "elections" and marching in parades displaying slogans prescribed by the government.

Forty years after the Soviet regime was established there is much less of what might be called the staple necessities of life, food, clothing, and housing, in the Soviet Union than there is in Western countries. But the division is at least as unequal. It is a small minority elite that possesses the large apartments, the chauffeur-driven cars, the luxurious summer villas, all the other rewards of "success." The majority of Soviet citizens remain poorly fed, poorly clothed, and miserably housed.

Nor is there any sign as the Soviet regime enters its fifth decade of that "withering away of the state" which Lenin fore-saw in the last phase of Communism and which he regarded as the justification for the intervening "dictatorship of the proletariat." On the contrary, the tremendous apparatus of police terror, of meticulous thought control shows no sign of abating.

Indeed, by one of the ironies of history the Soviet system and the Communist systems which have developed in China and Eastern Europe bear striking marks of similarity to what Marx thought the capitalist order was in 1848. The fusion of political and economic power, leading to one of the most effective despots in history, has been analyzed with ruthless and convincing clarity by Milovan Djilas, one of the few among many disillusioned ex-Communists, who has clearly sensed the causes of his own disillusionment. These excerpts from Djilas' penetrating work, *The New Class*, for which he received a further sentence of imprisonment in Tito's Yugoslavia, constitute an accurate and penetrating balance sheet of the Bolshevik Revolution, judged in the light of its own original professed ideals:

Theirs [the Communists] was the first revolution in history in which the revolutionaries not only remained on the political scene after victory, but, in the most practical sense, built social relationships completely contrary to those in which they believed and which they promised.

Marx' concrete forecasts proved inaccurate. To an even greater degree, the same may be said for Lenin's expectations that a free or classless society would be created with the aid of dictatorship.

Ownership is nothing other than the right of profit and control. If one defines class benefits by this right, the Communist states have seen, in the final analysis, the origin of a new form of ownership or of a new ruling and exploiting class.

In contrast to earlier revolutions, the Communist revolution, conducted in the name of doing away with classes, has resulted in the most complete authority of a single new class. Everything else is sham and illusion . . .

The use, enjoyment and distribution of property is the privilege of the [Communist] party and the party's top men.

Party members feel that authority, that control over property, bring the privileges of this world. Consequently unscrupulous ambition, duplicity, toadyism and jealousy must inevitably increase. Careerism and an ever expanding bureaucracy are the incurable diseases of Communism.

It may, of course, be argued that other revolutions, like the Puritan revolt against royal power in England in the seventeenth century and the French Revolution in the eighteenth, started out with utopian goals which were gradually shelved and yet, on balance, brought about necessary reforms and changes. Putting aside the question of how far the Communists remain faithful to their original ideals, what is the overall balance sheet of their forty years of rule in Russia?

This question cannot be answered without a good many qualifications and reservations. A comparison with Russia in 1917 is obviously unfair, because the last four decades have been a period of rapid scientific and technological progress affecting the whole world, except for some extremely retarded areas. It is not to be assumed that Russia under a non-Communist political and economic system would have stood still. There is every likelihood that the rapid economic progress of the decade before the war would have been maintained and that many of the construction projects of which the Soviet Government boasts would have been accomplished by private enterprise, and at a much smaller price in regimentation and privation. It could also be assumed that the transfer of land from the owners of big estates to the more enterprising and thrifty peasants, which was quite marked in the generation before the Revolution, would have gone on and might well have been accelerated because the government which had replaced the autocracy would most probably have enacted legislation looking to the compulsory alienation, with compensation, of much of the land held by the aristocracy.

Putting aside the unanswerable question of how Russia would have evolved if the Bolshevik Revolution had not taken place, what, in brief outline, is the balance sheet of forty years of Soviet Communism?

The biggest plus items are in the fields of industrialization, education, and scientific development. Allowing for errors in Soviet statistical calculation, making a further discount for poor quality of output, instances of which are often noted in Soviet newspapers, the industrial growth of the Soviet Union is impressive. New, large towns have grown up around modern industrial establishments where there were formerly only primitive villages.

The recent launching of two earth satellites is only the most spectacular of many accomplishments of Soviet science and technology. Russia was always rich in natural scientific capacity. What the Soviet government has done is to increase very much and improve the facilities given to natural scientists for their work and to give promising science students aid and encouragement by a far-reaching scholarship system.

Illiteracy, which was about fifty percent in Russia before the Revolution, has now been almost entirely eliminated except in some of the most remote areas of the Caucasus and Central Asia. There is, of course, a very definite propaganda aspect to Soviet education; the school, like the press and radio, is supposed to provide indoctrination with Communist ideas. In some branches of scholarship and the arts, in history and biography, economics and philosophy, literature and drama, creative expression is heavily handicapped by the necessity of conforming to the "party line," which sometimes shifts with disconcerting rapidity, making heroes out of villains and villains out of heroes. The appalling dullness of Soviet newspapers can only be appreciated by those who can read them. But, although individual creative talent is often frustrated, the Soviet peoples as a whole have larger and, as a rule, better school facilities than their fathers and grandfathers. And there is evidently a popular demand for the large editions of literary classics, foreign as well as Russian, which are published.

The greatest failures of the Soviet regime have been in humanitarian terms. One would have to go to the reign of Ivan the Terrible and to the darkest periods of Russian history to find parallels for such mass atrocities of Stalin as the calculated famine of 1932-33, designed to break the resistance of the peasants to collective farming, the "liquidation of the kulaks as a class," the regime of brutal overwork and semi-starvation in the slave labor concentration camps, the merciless purge of veteran Communists who became victims of the dictator's paranoid suspicion. In the number of victims and in the indiscriminate ruthlessness involved, these crimes go far beyond anything that could be accurately charged against the pre-war Tsarist administration.

Although the worst features of Stalin's terror were suspended or moderated after his death, there is still no genuine protection for the individual against the power of the state under a system where there is no freedom of press or election, no independence of the judiciary, no effective brake on the activity of the political police.

Another conspicuous failure of the Soviet system after forty years is the absence of any recognized standard of legitimacy in determining the succession in executive power. In the four years since Stalin's death there have already been four palace revolutions: the ouster, followed by the execution, of Lavrenti Beria, former head of the political police, in July, 1953; the replacement of Georgi Malenkov by Nikolai Bulganin (under the extending shadow of Nikita Khrushchev) as Prime Minister in February, 1955; the elimination from posts of leadership of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, and Shepilov in July, 1957; and the most recent degradation of Marshal Georgi Zhukov on the eve of the fortieth anniversary celebration. Where there is no accepted method of providing for an orderly succession this process of intrigue and jockeying for power among the key figures of a small self-appointed oligarchy will probably go on.

Looking back over forty years of Soviet history one can see strangely contrasted patterns of change and continuity developing side by side. The uprooting not only of individuals but of whole classes or groups has been on a scale never paralleled,

even in the greatest of previous upheavals, the French Revolution. But one can often find old Russia in new masks, a revival by the Soviet state of some of the more Asiatic repressive methods of the Tsars at a time when Russia had little contact with the West.

Soviet tactical attitudes on such issues as nationalism, education, military discipline, family relations have, on occasion, shifted quite drastically. But some things have remained constant, the one-party political dictatorship, the monopolistic control by the government of the industrial plant and economic resources of the country, the attitude of hostility and suspicion toward the non-Communist world.

In 1957, as in 1917, Communism, theoretical brain child of a cosmopolitan German Jew, which became the official creed of the revolutionaries who seized power in Russia in 1917, is a threat to the enduring values of Western civilization, with its inheritance of Hebrew-Christian religious ideals and Greco-Roman culture. But the nature of the threat has gradually and significantly changed.

Forty years ago Russia was no military threat to any nation; its armed forces were in complete dissolution. The weapon on which Lenin and the other Communist leaders relied was propaganda. They hoped and believed that the flame of revolution in Russia would spread to Germany and other European countries and then consume the whole world. On several occasions Lenin expressed the belief that the Soviet regime in Russia could not survive unless it was reinforced by Communist revolutions in other countries.

Now the possibility of Communist revolution in the more populous and more prosperous part of Europe outside the iron curtain is virtually non-existent. All the arts of Communist propaganda cannot outweigh the fact that voluntary movement of people is always from, never toward a Communist state. The mass flight since the war of between two and three million people from the Soviet Zone in Germany to the Federal Republic has been a more effective anti-Communist argument for Germans than any amount of theoretical propaganda. The brutal suppression of the free people's movement in Hungary

was the final blow to the prestige of Communism in Europe. Jean Paul Sartre, the French author and playwright who had wobbled uncertainly in his attitude toward Communism and sometimes approached a fellow-traveler position, broke with the French Communist Party in a letter in which he hurled the indictment:

"Once you might have been considered the party of the murdered. Now you are the party of the murderers."

But the growth of Soviet military power, the assimilation by the Soviet armed forces of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, Soviet progress with ballistic missiles, these developments pose a new threat. The danger is not so much that the Soviet rulers will actually make use of these ultimate weapons while they know that the United States possesses the means of retaliation in kind. The threat is rather that by rattling not sabres, but rockets, by using their possession of the most modern destructive weapons for blackmail, the Soviet government may be able to carry out a nibbling type of political advance which will finally upset the world balance of power.

So perhaps the greatest failure of Soviet Communism is that the Communist rulers cannot make a genuine peace either with their own people or with the peoples of the foreign countries which they have subjugated or with the peoples of the free world. This is indeed a tragedy, for Russia and for the world.

The Czechoslovak Legion*

By GEORGE KENNAN

II

By the beginning of May the Czech Corps was spread out all the way from the Penza area, west of the Volga, to Vladivostok, where the first trainloads were just arriving. A new interruption of its progress had been ordered by Moscow on April 21—occasioned, apparently, by news that Semenov had started a new offensive in the Trans-Baikal area. Once more, therefore, difficulties were placed in the way of its progress by local Soviet authorities; the trains idled in stations or on sidings; restlessness and tension grew on both sides.

The Czech commanders on the spot, meanwhile, remained in complete ignorance of the policy decision, arrived at by the French and British governments, to split the Corps. According to Bunyan's account, they were therefore amazed when they learned, at the beginning of May, that Chicherin had issued a new order authorizing release of the trains east of Omsk for further passage to Vladivostok but providing that those west of Omsk should be routed to the northern ports.¹ The amazement and consternation of the Czech commanders was increased when, on May 8, they received word from the representative of the Czechoslovak National Council at Vologda, Mr. Straka, that Chicherin's order had been issued by agreement with the Allied representatives in Russia. Their state of mind being what it was, the idea of splitting the Corps and thereby weakening such strength as it possessed seemed to them preposterous. They at

*This is the second of two excerpts on the Czechoslovak Legion from the second volume of the author's study of Soviet-American relations between 1917 and 1920 to be published by the Princeton University Press in February 1958. [Ed.]

¹J. Bunyan, Ed. *Intervention, Civil War, and Communism in Russia*, 1936, p.85.

once sent two envoys, Maxa and Markovič, to Moscow to find out what it was all about. Arriving in Moscow on May 13, the two envoys were told by General Lavergne that the change in route did indeed reflect the wishes of the Allies. They also saw Trotsky, who promised them that the Soviet authorities would assist in the transport of the First Division to Archangel.

Maxa and Markovič were about to return to Omsk, with a view to putting the new arrangements into effect, when the entire situation was changed by the receipt in Moscow of the news of an incident which had taken place at Chelyabinsk on May 14.² As luck would have it, one of the Czech troop trains standing in the station at Chelyabinsk found itself side by side with a trainload of Hungarian prisoners being evacuated from Siberia for repatriation. A stone or a piece of iron was thrown from the Hungarian into the Czech train and one of the Czech soldiers was killed by it. The Czechs retaliated by lynching the man who had thrown the missile.³ The Soviet authorities immediately set about to investigate the matter. Several Czech soldiers, whose collaboration was desired as witnesses, were arrested and incarcerated in the local jail. A Czech delegation was sent to demand their release. The members of this delegation were also arrested. Thereupon the Czechs, on May 17, took armed action, seized the local arsenal, and liberated their comrades.

Within a few days, as it happened, this particular incident was amicably settled with the local Soviet authorities. Had things been left to the two parties on the spot, the Czechs would presumably have continued peacefully on their journey. But meanwhile, the receipt of the news of the Czech action at Chelyabinsk produced a violent reaction in Moscow. Two representatives of the Czechoslovak National Council, Maxa and one other, were at once arrested and obliged to sign a telegraphic order to commanders of the Corps, telling them that all arms

²See *Ibid*, pp.85-86 for issuance of Chicherin's order and the further data mentioned above.

³The account of this incident, as reported by the local soviet military commissar, Sadlutski, to the War Commissariat in Moscow, is given verbatim in Jaroslav Kratochvil, *Cestg Revoluce*, Praha, 1928, pp. 550-551.

were to be delivered up at once to the Soviet authorities. A further order was then issued by Trotsky as Commissar for War to the Siberian soviets, directing them to detrain the Czech troops and "organize them into labor artels or draft them into the Soviet Red Army."⁴

These orders left to the commanders of the Corps no choice but to see the Corps disarmed, disbanded, and placed at the mercy of the local Communist authorities, or to proceed to a complete break with the Soviet government.

The incident at Chelyabinsk had happened to coincide with the convening in that city of a "Congress of the Czechoslovak Revolutionary Army." This gathering had originally been arranged for the purpose of establishing the future organization and command status of the Corps and considering the difficulties that had arisen in connection with its movement eastward. The Chelyabinsk incident, occurring in the same city, naturally preoccupied the attention of the delegates during the first days of the meeting. It brought home to them, in particular, realization of the looseness of the discipline exercised by the central Soviet authorities over the local soviets in Siberia. In these circumstances, the proposal for a splitting of the Corps aroused the most intense indignation and suspicion among the delegates. Unanimously, in the face of the outraged protestations of the French military representatives present, they voted to reject the project and to defy, in this respect, even the wishes of the Czechoslovak National Council and the Allies.⁵

It was in the midst of these events that the Congress received, on May 23, the new directive from the representatives of the Czechoslovak National Council, then under duress in Moscow,

⁴Bunyan, *op.cit.*, p. 88. There seems to be some uncertainty as to whether it was really the news of the Chelyabinsk incident that led to the arrest of these Czech representatives. The influence of the Czech Communists was unquestionably a factor. One would think that the Chelyabinsk incident must at least have been an important background factor.

⁵Margarete Klante, *Von der Wolga zum Amur . . .*, Berlin, 1931, pp. 143-145. Dr. Klante, in preparing her valuable study, had access not only to the personal papers of Else Brändström, the Swedish Red Cross representative in Siberia in the 1918 period, but also to the Archives of the Czechoslovak Legion, in Prague.

to the effect that all arms were to be delivered up to the Soviet authorities. A resolution was at once passed defying this directive as well and proclaiming the intention of retaining the arms and continuing on to Vladivostok. By the time the Czech commanders left Chelyabinsk on May 24, to return to their units, it is clear that they had agreed among themselves on some sort of operational plans for "shooting their way through," to be implemented immediately and without further ado, to whatever extent might be necessary, upon their return to their posts.

The news of the Chelyabinsk resolution was received within a matter of hours in Moscow, where it had a violent effect on the Soviet leaders. They reacted at once. On May 25, Trotsky despatched to the local soviets along the Siberian railway a telegram which began as follows:

All Soviets are hereby ordered to disarm the Czechoslovaks immediately. Every armed Czechoslovak found on the railway is to be shot on the spot; every troop train in which even one armed man is found shall be unloaded, and its soldiers shall be interned in a war prisoners' camp. Local war commissars must proceed at once to carry out this order; every delay will be considered treason and will bring the offender severe punishment . . .⁶

In relaying this order to the local soviets, the central Soviet military authorities in Siberia added:

. . . If your forces are not adequate to disarm them, do everything possible to stop the echelons: side-track them, take their locomotives, in urgent cases tear up the railway tracks . . .

It will thus be seen that by May 25 matters had come to a complete break between the Soviet government and the Czech Corps. Hostilities were now inevitable, by decision of both parties.

There has been a good deal of argument, subsequently, as to whether Trotsky's order for the breakup of the Czech force preceded or followed the Czech decision to fight the way through. The argument is idle. The Czechs took their decision before they had knowledge of Trotsky's telegram. Trotsky, when he sent the telegram, *did* have knowledge of the resolution of the Chelyabinsk Congress. In this sense, it may be said that

⁶Bunyan, *op.cit.*, p. 91.

the Czechs began the uprising. But they did so against the background of a long series of complications, in which rumor, confusion, and mistakes on the part of all concerned—Czechs, Bolsheviks, and Allies alike—played a part.

On May 26, hostilities between the Czechs and the Bolsheviks broke out all along the railway line from Penza to Irkutsk.

It has been, from the outset, the official Communist thesis that the Allies instigated the Czech uprising. On May 29, only three days after the outbreak of the hostilities between the Czechs and the Bolsheviks, Sadoul reported in one of his letters that Trotsky was convinced the Czech action was the result of a conspiracy between the Allies and the Russian oppositionists, that it was directed by French officers, and that it represented a species of dress rehearsal for a future Japanese intervention in Siberia.⁷ Soviet historians have continued to reiterate the same thesis, in one form or another, down to the present day. At first it was the French and British to whom these suspicions—or professed suspicions—related. Later, at the height of the anti-American campaign following World War II, the United States was insinuated into the ranks of the guilty.⁸

⁷Jacques Sadoul, *Notes sur la Révolution Bolchévique*, 1920, p. 369.

⁸As evidences of these allegations we may note the following.

The official Soviet "History of Diplomacy" says that the uprising occurred "on the orders of the Entente." (Potemkin, Ed., *Istoria Diplomatii*, Moscow, 1945, Vol. II, p. 383).

A. V. Berezkin, in a work for which he received the Stalin Prize in 1950, *S SHA-aktivny organizar i uchastnik voennoi interentsii protiv Sovetskoi Rossii 1918-1920 gg.* (USA-Active Organiser and Participant in Armed Intervention against Soviet Russia, 1918-1920), Moscow, 1952, p. 44, speaks of the plans of the "imperialists" in 1918 for a struggle against the Soviet republic, allowing it to be inferred that the "imperialists" in question were primarily the leaders of the American government. At another point, Berezkin refers to the uprising as "organized by the Anglo-French-American imperialists."

A. Ye. Kunina, in a volume bearing the significant title *Proval Amerikanskikh planov zavoyevaniya mirovogo gospodstva v 1917-1920 gg.* (The Fiasco of the American Plans for Achieving World Domination), State Publishing House of Political Literature, Moscow, 1954, says (p. 48): ". . . As a result of the direct instigation of the representatives of the U.S.A., England, and France and with their financial support there was organized a counter-revolutionary uprising of the Czechoslovak Corps against Soviet power."

How much truth is there in these charges? In view of the importance of the uprising for subsequent Allied, and particularly American, policy with regard to the intervention, one cannot refrain from examining this question.

We have already reviewed in some detail the discussions among the Allied chanceries of the future of the Czech Corps. We have seen that never, in the course of these discussions, was mention made of even the idea that the Czechs should rise up and challenge, alone, Soviet authority. Some of their Allied planners had envisaged their being retained, partly, in Russia; but no one had said anything about their starting a counter-revolution in May 1918. The Czech leaders abroad, notably Masaryk and Beneš, were still exerting themselves to achieve the earliest possible removal of the entire Corps to France.

But how about the Allied representatives in Russia?

The Corps, it will be recalled, had by this time become an integral part of the Czechoslovak Army in France and was technically under French command. The senior French officials in Russia—military and political—bore the immediate responsibility of giving guidance, on behalf of the Allies, to the commanders of the Corps and to the representatives in Russia of the Czechoslovak National Council. In the circumstances, with the various units strung out in trainloads all the way from Penza to Vladivostok, these lines of authority had unavoidably become tenuous and confused. It was generally recognized that operative decisions had to be left largely to the commanders of the Corps, to be decided by them in the light of circumstances. The commanders, as we have seen, defied the French over the proposal to split the Corps. Nevertheless, the principle of the Corps' subordination through Masaryk and the Czechoslovak National Council to the Allied cause, and to immediate French command, was never seriously questioned.

It was easy, in the confusions of 1918, to assume, as many did, that anything was likely to be true except the obvious; and it is intriguing even today to search for possible secret lines of authority, ulterior to the regular channel, running from the Allies to the Czechs and transmitting the impulses that resulted in the outbreak of hostilities. But nothing in the actual record

suggests that either Ambassador Noulens or General Lavergne was a figurehead, or that the overt and legitimate channel of authority was anything but the authentic one. French officers—one with the advance body which reached Vladivostok in late April and early May and two with the central body involved in the uprising—were stationed with the Corps for liaison purposes at the time the trouble broke out. Although their advice was sometimes overridden by the commanders of the Corps on grounds of urgent local necessity, their right to be there and to have a voice in the counsels of the Corps was never seriously disputed. The officers with the central body of the Corps, in the Volga-Urals area, were Major Alphonse Guinet and Captain Pascal. In the days immediately preceding the uprising, they were on the southern branch of the railway, running from Penza and Samara (now Kuibyshev) to Kurgan, over which echelons of the Corps were then being moved. They were attending, as observers, the Chelyabinsk Congress.

The French representatives in Moscow and Vologda were much disturbed by the news of the Chelyabinsk incident, by the subsequent arrest of the two representatives of the Czechoslovak National Council, and by the defiance of the order for evacuation of the First Division via Archangel and Murmansk. They correctly saw the entire project of the removal of the Czechs to the Western front, the execution of which they were under instructions to assure, as jeopardized by this development. The senior officers of the French Military Mission in Moscow at once concluded that the Czechs must now be told firmly that they must accept the Soviet order to disarm and rely on the benevolence and good faith of the Soviet authorities to assure their further movement to Vladivostok.

On learning of the Chelyabinsk incident, the chiefs of the French Military Mission despatched—on their own responsibility—an officer-courier to Guinet and Pascal, with instructions to tell the Czechs to submit to Soviet requirements—in other words, to disarmament. Then, it seems, they proceeded to Vologda, to enlist Noulens' support for the position they had taken. Noulens gives the following account of his meeting with these officers at Vologda:

The representatives of the Military Mission came running from Moscow to ask us to accept Trotsky's conditions—the only way, they said, of obviating the effects of his anger. I joined with the other Allied Chiefs of Mission to hear their views. Their arguments did not affect my conviction. Taking the floor after their statement, I defended before my colleagues the contrary thesis: that the Czechs had the right to leave with their arms; this right ought to be respected.

The Military Attachés argued against my point of view with such a passion that one of them, the American, went so far as to say to me: "You would not speak this way if it was a question of French soldiers."

I protested vehemently that I had too much esteem and sympathy for the Czechs to wish to treat them otherwise than as our own soldiers . . .⁹

As a result of Noulens' insistence it was decided, he says, to annul the orders to the Czech Corps to accept disarmament at the hands of the Bolshevik authorities. By this time, however, the officer-courier despatched by the French Military Mission had already left with the earlier orders. It became necessary, Noulens recounts, to send another officer to countermand this order and to tell the Czechs of the new decision.

So much for Ambassador Noulens' account. Let us note, once more, the timing of these events. All this took place shortly after the arrest of the two chief Czech representatives in Moscow on May 14-15. The first courier was apparently sent on the heels of that event. Raymond Robins, as will be seen in another chapter, also left Moscow on the evening of May 14 on his journey to the United States, via Vologda and Siberia. He must have passed through Vologda the following day, May 15. The conference in Vologda described by Noulens did not take place until some time between May 20 and May 25.

An American observer, Professor Edward Alsworth Ross, subsequently had the following to say in a book about the Russian Revolution:

It is certain that on the train which bore the American Red Cross Mission across Siberia in May [this obviously refers to the train on which Robins was traveling] there were Frenchmen who at every

⁹Joseph Noulens, *Mon Ambassade en Russie Soviétique*, 1933, Vol. II, pp. 85-86.

station where there were Czechoslovaks held long and confidential colloquies with the officers.¹⁰

Ross took this as evidence, in retrospect, that the French had been behind the uprising. Robins presumably gained a similar impression.

This incident may well stand as an example of the dangers of drawing general conclusions from isolated phenomena in complex situations. The conclusion seems inescapable that what Ross observed was actually the activity of the first French courier-officer, sent to tell the Czechs to submit.¹¹ The second emissary, sent after the conference in Vologda, could scarcely have reached the Urals district before the Czech uprising. The best evidence is that he actually arrived there on or about the last day of the month, four or five days after hostilities had begun.

From all of this it may be inferred that while Noulens, at some time between the Chelyabinsk incident (May 14) and the Czechoslovak uprising (May 25), had succeeded in imposing on his own military advisers and on the Allied official community in Vologda his view that the Czechs should be told to resist disarmament and detrainment and to "shoot their way out" to Vladivostok, and while a French military representative was indeed despatched, on the heels of this conference in Vologda, to the Urals and Siberia to acquaint the Czechs with this decision, these events had nothing whatsoever to do with the origin of the uprising. As of May 25, the French representatives on the spot, Guinet and Pascal, were both still under the impression that it was the desire of the French government that the Czechs should avoid, even at the cost of being disarmed

¹⁰Edward Alsworth Ross, *The Russian Soviet Republic*, New York, 1923, p. 135.

¹¹The original disposition of the French military representatives in Russia to see the Czechs continue to Vladivostok and not become involved in any action against the Soviet authorities finds confirmation in a message Ruggles, in Vologda, sent to the War Department on May 10. In this message Ruggles said that it was the intention of the French government to send these troops to France at the earliest possible moment and that none of them were to be used for policing the railroads or for collaboration with an Allied intervention "unless requested by Russia." *Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia*, Vol. II, *op.cit.*, p. 158.

and detained, every sort of military involvement with the Soviet authorities. Even had the second order reached these French liaison officers and the Czechs before the uprising, which it did not, its tenor was merely to the effect that the first order was cancelled and the Czechs were not to be *forbidden* to take armed action to assure their passage to Vladivostok. Nothing was said about their being encouraged to enter in any way into the Russian civil war or about their remaining in Russia to take part in Allied intervention. Such thoughts had no doubt been entertained by individual Allied representatives even before the uprising; they were indeed soon to gain general currency in Allied circles and to have a considerable effect on Allied policy *after the uprising had occurred*; but there is no evidence that they played any serious part in the guidance given to the Corps by the Allies in advance of the outbreak of hostilities.

It is worth noting that even Sadoul, despite his violent differences with Noulens and his heavy misgivings over Allied policy generally, was convinced at the time that Trotsky was wrong in his belief that the Allies had instigated the insurrection. It seems never to have occurred to him (and this is in itself significant, for he was well acquainted with the affairs of the French Military Mission) that such instigation could conceivably have come from the responsible French officials in Moscow or Vologda. The only possibility that occurred to him was that Guinet and Pascal might have exceeded their competence and encouraged the Czechs to revolt; and this possibility he at once rejected on the basis of his personal knowledge of both of these officers. Guinet seemed to him to be by nature incapable of participation in such a conspiracy. Of the other, "my friend, Lt. Pascal," he wrote:

... Although I am legitimately suspected of sympathy for the Bolshevik government, I have nevertheless not lost all critical sense and my sympathy is not without reservations. The admiration entertained by Pascal, a Tolstoyan Catholic, for a movement of which he appreciates above all the evangelical value—an admiration which has remained strictly in the speculative sphere (Pascal has never known a Bolshevik)—does not predispose him to any military action against the Soviets. He is furthermore the most disciplined and loyal of soldiers. I am convinced that both in obedience to orders and by personal conviction he has respected the instructions of the Mission

which . . . are certainly not to fan the flames, even if they are also not to extinguish them. I said all this to Trotsky. It is only too obvious that France would have everything to lose in so deplorable an adventure which could only end sooner or later in the crushing of the unfortunate insurgents. The only serious utilization of the Czechs is on the western front, where they are awaited with enthusiasm.¹²

Somewhat later, to be sure, Sadoul would write with considerable bitterness about the Allied involvement in the *further course* of the Czech uprising; but this bitterness related to things the Allies did—as will be seen in a later chapter—*after* the uprising had taken place.

Sadoul's belief in the innocence of Guinet and Pascal is fully borne out by what is known of their behavior at the time of the uprising. At the Chelyabinsk Congress Guinet strongly pressed the Czech delegates to submit to disarming and to accept the orders of the Czechoslovak National Council. Shortly after the outbreak of the hostilities Guinet found himself in Omsk where, on May 31, he participated in a local conference with Czech and Soviet representatives. The purpose of this conference was to try to find some peaceful solution of the situation at Isikul, just west of Omsk. Here, a party of Czechs had entered into hostilities with a Communist force, and a menacing military deadlock had ensued. The conference was attended by the American Vice Consul, Mr. L. S. Gray. The Soviet representative read out an interception telegram from the Czech commander at Chelyabinsk to other Czech commanders along the line, telling them ". . . the situation had developed to such an extent that the French control would have to be disregarded for the time."¹³ Guinet thereupon despatched a telegram to the Czechs at Isikul of the following tenor:

¹²Sadoul, *Notes . . . , op.cit.*, p. 369. Pascal subsequently became a distinguished scholar in the Slavic field and has recently occupied the position of Professor of Russian Languages, Literature and Civilization at the Sorbonne.

¹³Ernest Lloyd Harris Papers; files of the American Consul General in Vladivostok for the period 1918-1920, Hoover Institute and Library, Stanford; Gray's report of November 10, 1918 entitled "Political Situation in the Omsk District, covering period from May 1918 to date."

Your action forces the French Mission to wash its hands of this affair. It will be a disgrace for the Czechs to become involved in Russian difficulties. If the Czechs persisted in their activities everything must end between them and the French Government. The Czechs must take no action whatever until the French Mission [which was leaving Omsk immediately] arrived in Isilkul.¹⁴

This message makes it abundantly clear that as of May 31, Guinet had received no instructions envisaging retention by the Czechs of their arms or actions by them against the Bolsheviks in support of a possible Allied intervention.

In all this background of the uprising the Americans were in no way involved, other than by the fact that Francis, in conference with his Allied colleagues in Vologda, supported the French Ambassador in the view that the Czechs ought not to be required to submit to disarmament and detrainment. When the uprising occurred, the American official representatives in the Siberian cities, as we shall also see in a later chapter, did everything in their power, even to the point of embarrassing and irritating the Czech commanders, to compose differences between the Czech and the local soviet authorities and to facilitate the peaceful passage of the Czech trains to Vladivostok. There is not the slightest indication that they had any foreknowledge of the uprising or encouraged it in any way.

So much for what must be taken as the primary evidence as to direct Allied involvement. In addition to this, we must take note of the further possibility, implicit in some of the statements from the Communist side, that the uprising was the result of some sort of prearrangement between the Czechs and the Russian oppositionist parties, of which the Allies had knowledge and to which—despite their own contrary official position in the matter—they gave at least tacit encouragement.

It would carry us too far from the central theme of this study to attempt to describe at this point the various opposition groupings which were active in European Russia in the spring of 1918 and to reproduce and analyze in detail the individual bits of evidence concerning their relationship to the Allies and the Czechs. The nature and significance of this evidence might, however, be summarized as follows.

¹⁴*Ibid.*

The Soviet historian P. S. Parfenov, in works published in the early 1920's, alleged that the central military staff of the Social-Revolutionary Party "learned" in April 1918 that Lavergne and Lockhart were engaged, together with members of a conservative underground officers' group, in working out plans for the overthrow of Soviet power and the restoration of Russian military resistance to Germany, and that these plans envisaged using the Czechs, in coordination with the Russian opposition groups, to seize the Siberian railways and destroy the Soviet forces in the Siberian area. Parfenov even speaks, in another place, of a meeting of April 14 at the French Military Mission in Moscow, where representatives of the British, French, Czech, and Russian opposition groups were said to be present. Lockhart and a Captain Konshin, shown as being in contact with an underground officers' group in Novo-Nikolayevsk (now Novosibirsk), are specifically named as having been present.¹⁵

A similar report is to be found in a despatch reviewing the history of the origins of the Kolchak regime in Siberia, written somewhat later (1919) by American Consul Alfred R. Thomson, who had been stationed at the key point of Omsk at the time of the Czech uprising. Thomson also mentions the presence of Lockhart and Lavergne at an alleged meeting of this nature, and goes on to say that the Czechs

. . . were to have been asked to begin their hostilities against the Bolsheviks later than they actually did; but the German Government . . . urged Trotsky to disarm the Czechoslovaks, and thus precipitated the crisis earlier than had been designed.¹⁶

¹⁵P. S. Parfenov, *Grazhdanskaya voina v Sibiri* (The Civil War in Siberia), Moscow, 1924. See also John Albert White, *The Siberian Intervention*, Princeton, 1950, pp. 249-250. White cites another volume by Parfenov: *Uroki proshlago, grazhdanskaia voina v Sibiri 1918, 1919, 1920 gg.* (Lessons of the Past, The Civil War in Siberia), Harbin, pp. 29-32. The Name of Captain Konshin also appears in the "Sisson Documents" (*The German-Bolshevik Conspiracy*, War Information Series, No. 20—October, 1918, Issued by the Committee on Public Information, George Creel, Chairman, Document No. 2)—a circumstance which does not contribute to the reliability of Parfenov's story.

¹⁶Harris MSS, *op-cit.* despatch of August 16, 1919 from Consul Alfred R. Thomson, on special detail at Omsk to the Department of State.

Parfenov's allegations, which do not appear to be substantiated by any proof or citation of source, make—on various counts—a highly unreliable impression. They could, in fact, have been written only by someone who was not familiar with the circumstances in which the Czech Corps found itself at that time and with its relations, generally, with the Allies. What is said about Lockhart and Lavergne accords with nothing else that is known (and a great deal *is* known) about the official endeavors and personal inclinations of those two men at the time. Thomson's statement, also proffered without any indication of source, was evidently based on secondhand accounts he had heard from Russian officials in Siberia in the Kolchak time; and cannot be taken as solid historical evidence. The reference to the German government, incidentally, is flatly incorrect, and represents simply the gossip then current in Siberia.

The closest friends of the Czechs, on the Russian political scene, were the Right S-R's. With them the Czechs had both an ideological bond (their sympathies lying—for the most part—somewhere between the "bourgeois" parties and the Bolsheviks) and an organizational bond—through the leaders in the Siberian section of the Russian cooperative movement. The cooperatives were largely a movement of the independent peasantry (particularly strong in western Siberia). They were naturally close to the S-R's, who were outstandingly the peasants' party. A number of leaders of the cooperative movement in Siberia were prominent in S-R circles. The Czechs concluded a contract with the Siberian cooperatives for the supply of food to the Corps on its movement across Siberia. This placed the commanders of the Corps in close touch with the cooperative leaders and the S-R's all along the line. Since the Czech uprising was immediately followed, and in some instances even accompanied, by uprisings of local Russian groups against the Bolsheviks—uprisings in which the S-R's played a leading part, especially at the outset—the question at once arises as to whether there was instigation of the Czech action by the S-R's.

There were two main centers where Russian groups took military and political action against the Bolsheviks in the immediate wake of the Czech action. In both instances the S-R's

were prominently involved. One was Samara, on the Volga; the other, central Siberia, in particular the region of Omsk and Novo-Nikolayevsk. In each case plans for an insurrection against the Bolsheviks by the S-R's and secret groups of ex-officers had been worked out long in advance of the Czech action. But in each case the target dates envisaged were ones considerably later than the end of May. There is no reason to doubt that the anti-Communist leaders concerned—well aware of the situation of the Czech Corps, of its potential strength, and of the difficulties it was experiencing with the Soviet authorities—hoped that the Czechs would in some way contribute to their own contemplated actions.¹⁷ But that was quite a different thing from instigating the Czechs to rise up on May 26.

In the case of the Samara group the best historical evidence indicates that the local underground S-R leaders had no idea that any Czech action was forthcoming at the end of May, and learned of it only subsequently by reports from Moscow. When they did learn of it, they at once got into touch with the Czechs, of course, in order to coordinate further actions.¹⁸

As for Omsk and Novo-Nikolayevsk, this was a very special situation. Novo-Nikolayevsk was not only the seat of the military staff of the S-R Party but the center, generally, of the underground officers' activity in Siberia. A leading figure in this activity was the young Russian officer Grishin-Almazov. Although the officer-conspirators were generally not of socialist persuasion and viewed the S-R's with much suspicion, Grishin-Almazov believed, at that time, in the necessity of a collaboration between the two groups in action against the Bolsheviks.

¹⁷In the foreword of a book by B. Solodovnikov on Gajda's part in the Siberian civil war (*Sibirskie aventury i General Gaida* [The Siberian Adventures and General Gajda] Prague, undated) the following passage occurs:

"As early as the beginning of May 1918 I met on one occasion in Moscow, in the apartment of the lawyer Vilenkin and in the presence of the Colonel of the General Staff N. Poradelov, with the well-known S-R, Colonel V. I. Lebedev, and gained the understanding that in preparing their uprising, the S-R's were placing hopes on the Czechoslovaks."

¹⁸M. V. Vishnyak, *Vserossiiskoye uchreditelnoye sobraniye* (The All-Russian Constituent Assembly), *Sovremennye Zapiski*, Paris, 1932, pp. 148-149.

He therefore worked closely together with the S-R military staff in the same city.

The commander of the central group of Czech trains, with headquarters at Novo-Nikolayevak, was, as it happened, a young Czech officer who was later to gain much notoriety as an adventurer and fire-eater: Rudolph Gajda.¹⁹ Strongly anti-Bolshevik and thirsting for violent action, Gajda was the principal moving spirit behind the decision taken at the Chelyabinsk Congress to defy the Bolsheviks and fight the way out to Vladivostok. As a result of the obstacles placed by the Soviet authorities in the path of the Czech movement, his command had been detained at Novo-Nikolayevsk for some time prior to the uprising. There he had become acquainted with the underground Russian officers' group, whose views and impatience for action he fully shared. Far from being pressed by them to take action against the Bolsheviks, Gajda did his best to induce them to rise up against the local Soviet authority, promising them Czech support if they did. "You just start in," he is said to have assured Grishin-Almazov, "and we'll take care of the Bolsheviks."²⁰ When the Czechs themselves then decided to take action, Gajda at once coordinated his activity locally with that of the Russian group, and the two organizations moved together to overthrow Soviet authority in the entire area from Omsk through Novo-Nikolayevsk to Krasnoyarsk.

The Czechs, through their contacts with Gajda and others, were well informed of the strength of the anti-Soviet sentiment in central Siberia and of the existence of the underground officers' groups, straining to seize power at the earliest possible moment. When, at the Chelyabinsk Conference, they arrived at the decision to shoot their way through if necessary, the Czechs had these circumstances in mind. But their purpose at that moment was only to assure their own security and safe passage.

¹⁹In addition to causing a good deal of trouble during the course of the Siberian intervention, Gajda later became—in the Hitler period—the leader of a small Czech fascist party which the Nazis toyed with—half-heartedly and unsuccessfully—as a means of sowing dissension and gaining influence among the Czechs.

²⁰P. N. Milyukov, *Rossiya na perelome* (Russia at the Crossroads), Paris, 1927, Vol. II, *Anti-Bolshevik Movement*, p. 32.

Aside from the purely local situation at Novo-Nikolayevsk there seems to have been nothing at all that could be described as a "plot" between the Czechs and the Russian Whites. The situation was well described in an official Czech account of the origins of the uprising, drawn up during the immediate aftermath of these events by the Temporary Executive Committee of the Czechoslovak Army, entrusted by the Chelyabinsk Congress with the further direction of the military operations and political negotiations of the Corps:

... the Czechoslovaks from their intimate knowledge of political conditions throughout Russia judged that the feeling against the Bolsheviks was strongest in the very regions where most of their echelons were located, namely in the Urals and western Siberia. The executive committee, therefore, in planning their action, took cognizance of these facts, and planned to take advantage both of the weakness of the Red Army and of the strong popular feeling against the Bolsheviks to force their way through to the east. That their action would be accompanied by or followed by the overthrow of the Soviet Government and the establishment of a new government in western Siberia never entered into their calculations, although later when the fall of the Soviet government was an accomplished fact, the Czechoslovaks were the first to welcome the new government and to lend it their moral and armed support.²¹

All in all, therefore, one is reduced to the conclusion that external instigation or encouragement, either from the Allies or from the central headquarters of the underground Whites, played no significant part in the decision of the Czechs to take arms against Soviet power. The outbreak of these hostilities was a spontaneous occurrence, resulting from decisions and actions promulgated, respectively and almost simultaneously, by the Soviet authorities in Moscow and in Siberia and by the Czech commanders on the spot. It was a development desired by none of the parties concerned—neither by the Bolsheviks nor by the Allies, nor by the majority of the Czechs themselves.

It is idle to attempt to find in this occurrence the reflection of any deliberate conspiracy or of any special duplicity on one side or the other. Neither side was without provocation in the events that led to it, and neither was without blame. Its reasons

²¹Harris MSS, *op.cit.*, from an English translation of the paper in question, undated, entitled "The Czechoslovak Incident."

must be sought primarily in the general climate of confusion and suspicion that prevailed at this culminating moment of war and revolution; in the extremely complex situation in which the Czech Corps then found itself; in the complicating factor of the presence of large numbers of the war prisoners of the Central Powers, partly Bolshevikized and partly not so, all along the Siberian line; in the abundant rumors of German instigation of Soviet actions; and in the inadequacy of the disciplinary bonds that ran both from the Allies to the Czechs and from the Soviet government in Moscow to the local soviets throughout Siberia.

Bearing in mind these factors it is easy to see that the Czech Corps, representing at the moment—as it did—the strongest compact and unified armed force in all of Siberia, could hardly fail to become, willingly or unwillingly, a factor in the state of smouldering civil conflict that had been brought into being throughout Siberia by the sudden Communist seizure of power. Had the Corps succeeded in making its way peacefully through the vast tinderbox of central Siberia during the spring of 1918, striking no sparks and raising no crucial issues as it went along, this—rather than what actually occurred—would have been the true wonder.

East Moves West - The Enigma of Vladimir Solovyov

By RICHARD HARE

VLADIMIR SOLOVYOV (1853-1900), son of the eminent Russian historian, Sergei Solovyov, acquired, soon after he died, some fleeting international fame for his singular life-long activity as a heretical Christian philosopher, prophetic visionary, and almost saintly eccentric. At a time when the confused remnants of lingering religious enthusiasm had not yet been analyzed into bloodless categories by theologians, and before the wings of soaring philosophy had been neatly clipped into shape by logical positivists, Solovyov's admirers were bold enough to describe him as at once the most typical and the most profound of all contemporary Russian thinkers.

But even such limited interest in him quickly dwindled, till it is now almost confined to a few neo-Christian commentators, who have dwelt on religious qualities and defects, but have tended to ignore his mental scope and intuitive insight wherever these conflict with their predominantly theological concerns. His intellectual severity in fact prepared the way for more sensational theosophists and fashionable eclectics, who later grouped themselves around Madame Blavatsky, Gurdjieff, and Ouspensky.

Solovyov's undoubtedly religious cast of mind grew steadily more heretical, independent, and sardonic with advancing years. The dreary scholastic jargon and hair-splitting pendency, which mar many of his earlier writings, become redeemed in his maturity by touches of imaginative warmth, insight, and subtle irony, which reveal a judgement more and more strongly tinged with a prophetic sense of the shape of things to come, like an explorer who responds to the tang of salty air before the unknown sea comes into sight. Although he behaved throughout

his life with a quiet unworldly indifference to money, professional ambition, and personal popularity, he never shut himself up in a hermit's cell, but remained so alive to the deeper psychological undercurrents of his time, that towards the end, fresh conclusions drawn from the facts of his experiences caused him to reject wholeheartedly all the main theological objectives which had been sacred to him in his youth.

Already in his early childhood Solovyov's ardent but unstable temperament caused him to be carried away by passionate attachments to such diverse individuals as coachmen, beggars, and young girls, and at the age of nine he started to see erotic visions, which gave him mystic consolation for his largely unrequited human loves. Although he read voraciously at school, he was not content to be a bookworm, for he also delighted in military parades and boisterous practical jokes.

At the age of fourteen he suddenly became an ardent atheist, ceased to go to church, and embraced the familiar view that materialism would "transform human beings and start a new chapter in world history."¹ Within the next four years, however, he had rejected in disgust Darwin and the materialists and swung over to Spinoza, who helped him to discipline his own intimate mystical experience. The pursuit of this metaphysical phase led him on to Kant, who cured him of dogmatic conceit, and thence to Schopenhauer, whose dominating Buddhist strain appealed to his oriental nostalgia.

During his student years he felt strongly drawn towards various young women, including two of his cousins, but all these relationships failed to stand the strain of his intense analytic approach to them. After 1872 he seems to have become convinced that his vocation was quite incompatible with marriage, and resigned himself to an ascetic bachelorhood. Plunged once more in study, he wrote a thesis for Moscow University, entitled *The Crisis of Western Philosophy* (1874), where he enlarged on the spiritual bankruptcy disclosed by recent Western thought, though without indicating whether any more fruitful alternative could be derived from Russia. Thence he switched over to the past history of more ancient civilizations, and became fascinated

¹K. Mochulsky, V. Solovyov. Paris, 1951. p. 23.

by the deeper esoteric appeal of some almost forgotten Eastern religious cults.

In 1875 he traveled to London, in order to read in the British Museum the rare gnostic literature connected with the cult of the mysterious Sophia, long worshipped in different shapes as the female emanation of divine wisdom, occasionally materializing in this earthly world. The full rigors of residence in a cheap Bloomsbury lodging house hardly seem to have dampened his ardor, and he made no comment whatsoever on such local peculiarities of the English scene.

He spent all his days studying in the British Museum, and at night he sampled some séances arranged by English spiritualistic circles, of whom, however, he quickly tired, pronouncing them to be cunning charlatans, who traded on the foibles of superstitious cranks. But even this rather dim existence in the musty reading room did not pass without some compensating excitement, for one day, poring over his volumes there, the divine Sophia suddenly appeared before him in a dazzling vision, and he distinctly heard her voice, commanding him to go to Egypt, there to await the next stage of enlightenment. Far from treating this experience as a hallucination, Solovyov made no attempt to analyze its origin, but acted on it immediately. He promptly packed his modest bags and booked a passage to Cairo, convinced that he would be vouchsafed a further revelation of divine wisdom somewhere on the banks of the Nile.

He spent four months in Egypt, on the pretext that he was learning Arabic, and claimed to have seen another vision in which his *eternal friend*, Sophia, appeared in a radiant flash surrounded by a sky-blue haze, and communicated to him a conviction of spiritual unity in the world. His sojourn also brought him more tangible adventures. When he retired to the neighboring desert to meditate, wearing a top-hat and a black European overcoat, he was attacked by Beduin Arabs, who had never seen such a costume in their lives. He cut such a sinister figure, with his pale face and cavernous eyes, framed in a mass of curly black hair, that they mistook him for an evil spirit. But they only robbed him of his watch and left him to spend the night in the sand. He was later joined in Egypt by his philo-

sophic friend, Prince D. Tsertelev, a fellow-admirer of Schopenhauer and a writer of graceful verses about the extinction of the universe.

On his return to Russia in 1874, he had become more realistic and started to lecture on philosophy at Moscow University. He made friends with Dostoevsky, whom he accompanied on a visit to the famous Optina monastery. Dostoevsky, who was already working on *The Brothers Karamazov*, took a fancy to the eloquent young philosopher and is said to have drawn on him for the character of his gentle neophyte Alyosha, but also probably for some of the sardonic twists in Ivan Karamazov's dialectic. After the accession of Alexander III in 1881, Solovyov pleaded firmly in a lecture at St. Petersburg University that the Emperor's first duty was to pardon his father's murderers, win the hearts of his subjects by setting such an unprecedented example of Christian conduct, and thereby establish his moral authority over them on an unshakable foundation. For this pronouncement he was cheered by an enthusiastic audience, but the university authorities sent him a formal reprimand and an order to stop lecturing altogether until further notice.

In November of the same year he resigned from his university post. Although the Rector assured him that he was not expected to resign, Solovyov persisted. He thus became a writer relying entirely on his own resources, without any institutional axe to grind, earning eventually through his outspoken and honest utterances the nickname *enfant terrible* of the Russian intelligentsia.

Like a growing number of his compatriots, Solovyov felt dismayed by the spiritual vacuum resulting from the latest course of Western philosophy and organized religion. He saw that both had sunk into either a state of paralysis or of irritable anemia, ceasing to inspire their own people, or to give any guiding stimulus to more primitive outsiders, who formerly admired and looked to the West. He deplored the quite indiscriminate stress now laid by scientific positivists on what they loosely called the survival of the fittest. Was it not leading in fact towards a cult of the ugliest two-legged brutes, and encouraging an insidious debasement of personal judgement and

initiative, imprisoned in a commercial milieu of increasingly monotonous vulgarity?

Solovyov dismissed with curt contempt the loud claims advanced by some so-called socialists that they alone had picked up the fallen banner and would at last put Christian teachings into administrative practice. He observed that whereas Christ had appealed to the conscience of good people to help the poor, socialists had cunningly tried to make robbery respectable and corrupt the poor, by commanding them to seize the property of more substantial, if not more deserving people. Nor could he see any benefit in the new breed of theoretical Nihilists, who disputed the plain necessity of modern banks, trade, monetary capital, and private property.

In any case, he argued, these social institutions acquired human importance only when they served as a foundation for some higher superstructure. Even the formal political unification of all the separate countries now professing Christendom (whose practicability he then believed in) would remain an empty and useless shell, unless a heartfelt unification of the perpetually squabbling Christian Churches had first preceded it. He therefore began to rack his brains for any conceivable method whereby the self-centered sovereign nation-states might be combined, raised to the level of a workable theocracy, and thence start to bridge the ominous gulf which divided criminal national politics more and more from any honest personal morality. His *La Russie et l'Eglise Universelle* (1889), envisaged a complicated but mutual plan of action worked out between the Pope and the Russian Emperor to organize a new type of Holy Roman Empire designed to stop the deadly ravages of contemporary international cannibalism. In this curious compact, the Russian ruler would give his full material support to the moral authority of the Roman high priest, and the Orthodox Church would obediently acknowledge the Roman See as its superior.

Like Chaadaev in the reign of Nicholas I, Solovyov was disgusted by the boastful claims still advanced by a fabulous "Holy Russia," that it incorporated an original and model theocratic state. He admitted that the practical and social-minded

Roman Church, despite its many worldly defects, had till now done infinitely more than the Orthodox state-church to promote "the kingdom of God on earth." He knew that incurable Russian national *mystique* was still leading her towards disaster and clearly foresaw his country's humiliating defeat by Japan, when he wrote in 1894:

Russia, forget your former glory,
The double-headed eagle has been crushed,
And your torn banners handed over
As playthings to the yellow children . . .
The Third Rome lies in ashes,
And a fourth there will never be.

His article "Byzantinism and Russia" (1896) explained how the Russian Orthodox Church, poisoned by its inheritance of Byzantine politics, had long since lost the last vestige of any right to set a guiding example to other Churches. Real religion had been killed in Russia, by being slowly strangled in the red tape of a government department, and thereby ceasing to act as a free creative art. Though Orthodox ritual retained relics of its former purity and beauty, servile state service, hand in hand with compulsory hypocrisy, had long since smothered the soul of the Orthodox Church, and debauched its priests. "To fear Catholic propaganda means no longer to believe in the inner force of our own Church. But if we have truly ceased to believe in it, why should we continue to defend our Church at all?" he wrote in 1884. In 1896 Solovyov took communion in a Uniate (Graeco-Catholic) Church, though without breaking off his diplomatic relations with Orthodoxy. A bitter but somewhat senseless controversy ensued, as to whether or not he had become a full Catholic convert, and hence a renegade to his native faith.

The relevant answer is a simpler one, for he had by then abandoned belief in any and every ecclesiastical authority and frankly described himself as a religious freethinker. "I am as far removed from the cramping narrowness of Rome as from that of Byzantium or Geneva," he wrote in 1892, and he began to suspect that all established churches had hardened into dis-

guised obstacles to moral progress, and now did more to confuse and degrade human beings than to promote in them a fruitful religious state of mind.

When he finally awoke to the total practical futility of his grandiose theocratic plans to fuse established churches with existing nation-states, the modern survival of the old historic Christian drama, together with the many institutions which revolved around it, sank into an irrelevant puppet-show for him. He reached a similar conclusion about the blighting effect of state administration, in its bureaucratic national forms. "We must resolutely separate," he said, "the national character of a people from the nationalist policy of its government, by distinguishing the fruits of each. We see the fruits of English national character in Shakespeare, Byron, Berkeley, and Newton, of English nationalist policy in world-wide plunder; of German national character in Lessing, Kant, and Schelling, of German nationalism in the subjugation of its neighbors by military violence and fraud." But every national self-idolization would sooner or later find its bitter end in national self-destruction. The legend of Narcissus ought to edify not only individuals but whole nations.

About his own country's exclusive aspirations he preserved enough detachment to observe: "Our non-European and anti-European cravings, our artificial originality, always were, and still are, nothing but the emptiest pretensions. To break away from them is the first and only condition of our success. Better to renounce patriotism than destroy conscience."²

He began to regret that he had wasted so much time and energy in writing about what he now saw to be such sheer delusions as the re-unification of the Christian Churches, the reconciliation of Jews with Christians, the elevation of overgrown nation-states to a more harmonious theocratic level. No honest person could any longer believe in such colossal naivétés, still less try to bring them into being. Priests and theologians between them had managed to make organized Christianity either a repulsive fraud, or such a dreary and petty business that it bored men to extinction. He thought it right to warn

²"The National Question in Russia," 1891.

people that the waning churches would nevertheless make a final bid to recover their authority, and to reconquer by brute force the many human beings who now inwardly rebelled against their deadening control.

Therefore the latest course of Christian politics, instead of moving gradually, even though with strenuous effort, towards a moral goal (as he had formerly believed) began to assume a definitely sinister and catastrophic character. The universal Church, due to embrace mankind from China to Peru (if it ever materialized) would now emerge on earth, not as a blessing, but as a frightful curse. For every *official* union entered into between the Churches of the world, as arranged by their leading representatives, would inevitably seek to perpetuate their own rule, and at least ninety percent of the corrupt modern monks and clergy would be readily persuaded to go over to the side of Anti-Christ. Only a small, persecuted minority would remain "unshaken, unseduced, unterrified," and continue to wage its unequal struggle against the passions of the human crowd, on the verge of being totally hypnotized by the prevailing powers of darkness.

Instead of seeing the future, as he once did, through a rosy optimistic haze of hard-won moral triumph, Solovyov began to reckon with the overwhelming power of evil, no longer as a blank negative obstacle, but as a dynamic undermining force. His "The Tale of the Anti-Christ" (1900), provides at once an admirable confession of his own tremendous mental errors as well as a parody full of ironic eloquence, revealing the organized fulfillment of his much-discussed theocratic state, as nothing better than the concealed devilish empire of Anti-Christ, successfully established on this earth.

His *Three Conversations* (1900), was designed to picture the modern struggle against evil from four distinctly individual standpoints. It takes the form of a Platonic dialogue between a patriotic general, a cynical politician, a naively idealistic prince (like Tolstoy) and a Mr. Z (not unlike Solovyov himself). The speeches of the general reveal a traditionally religious man, who nevertheless found the most complete moral satisfaction he had ever known in committing murder, ". . . and not an

ordinary little murder, for in the course of one hour I killed over a thousand men." He still remembered this act of his, not only without remorse, but as "something great, holy and honorable." The men he had mown down with his artillery were Bashi-Bazouks who had razed an Armenian village to the ground, tortured and massacred its inhabitants, and roasted babies before their mothers' eyes.

The politician is a mild and moderate liberal, who would prefer to overcome evil by ignoring its existence. He talks about peaceful progress and the spread of civilized polite behavior, assuming that for states long since consolidated by war, the military period of history had conveniently become an obsolete historical phase.

Mr. Z, whose views have more substantial reference to the future, shows some sympathy for the general, but has no use either for the liberal politician or the pacifist prince. He is severe in facing facts, calls it sheer idiocy to forgive every wrong and to repay evil deeds by goodness (which a wicked recipient would certainly despise). He told a cautionary tale to warn against sentimental evangelists and to illustrate how scoundrels are infuriated and made still more vindictive when they are met by feeble and calculated acts of kindness.

Solovyov had previously ridiculed the ascetic self-denial of the most advertised Tolstoyans (who carried Tolstoy's teaching to absurd extremes) when he wrote during the 1891 famine: "Our hungry people reached a degree of *simplification* which embarrassed even our best-fed simplifiers. While they still pronounce a poverty-stricken life to be a normal one, they stop short of accepting the normality of death by slow starvation . . ."³

Mr. Z concluded that people were still free to choose between violent or peaceful methods in resisting the insidious growth of evil throughout the world, but their final choice might be influenced by a clearer picture of evil's short-lived ultimate triumph and eventual self-destruction. He provides that picture in the vivid "The Tale of the Anti-Christ," an imaginary forecast of probabilities drawn from present facts.

³"The Peoples' Misery and Social Help," 1891.

Solovyov can hardly be blamed for seeking entirely new threads of sense and sequence amid the chaos of contemporary history, and what he said in his works about the approaching end of the world need not be termed apocalyptic, where it signified the real end of European history in its coherent and consecutive ancient, medieval, and modern stages. For he believed that the former main road of individual human growth and aspiration had been deliberately abandoned by Western nation-states; he saw their regimented citizens left to the mercy of commerce and spasmodic emotional waves, unsteadily controlled by bogus progressives or blind conservatives. Instead of the former developing drama of lively creative personalities, a game of political marionettes had appeared upon the scene, imitating traditional movements of the past, playing with scientific technique and atavistic passions, but principally maneuvering to expand their own prestige and wealth at the expense of those they ruled by force and fraud.

Solovyov said that he felt the wings of a dark shadow hovering over the twentieth century, which would usher in an era of convulsive wars and widespread revolutions. God would surely punish all the smug, conceited western nations, including Russia, when their collective crimes and follies reached a climax, and he foresaw (not without relish) the ominous shape which that punishment would probably take. While the nations of the West continued to squabble and disintegrate through their own laziness and greed, Japan and China would learn their lessons and unite against the West. The tables would thus be turned on Europe and America.

"When China, waking up like Japan, begins with the aid of machines to make European goods, when its hitherto inert masses respond to the challenge of Western countries, and intensify the terrifying economic competition from which exhausted Europe is already suffering, in a word when the artisans of the West see their factories closed down, their work coming to an end, what will happen next?"⁴ The easy-going Western workmen could no longer gain by organizing strikes for higher wages and shorter hours of work, when their tougher and more

⁴"Europe and Her Rivals," 1896.

industrious competitors had already captured all their markets.

Not only the Far Eastern races, but the Arabs of Africa and Asia would start to revolt against further economic infiltration from the West, until the Western countries found themselves involved in a bloody struggle against nationalist Islam. Finally, the yellow races, now equal to the West in economic skill and strength, and overwhelming in sheer numbers, would seize their opportunity to start a new pan-Mongolian conquest and overrun the whole of Europe.

The new Mongolian yoke, imposed upon humiliated Western countries, would last for half a century at least. At first the influx of hungry Asiatic artisans to work abroad would provoke acute dismay among their ruined and unemployed Western competitors, but gradually it would lead to organized resistance and to the creation of secret international societies designed to obstruct and expel the yellow races.

Only through a desperate struggle to escape from this cruel purgatory of servitude to revengeful Asiatics, would Western nations learn at last to overcome their national vanity and internecine economic rivalry and thereby achieve an effective super-national organization of their own.

In his last talk with Prince S. N. Trubetskoi, a few days before his death, Solovyov reverted to his firm belief that the main line of European history had definitely ended. "Loaded with a lot of clumsy moral baggage, the European peoples now start to wage their war against China . . . yet they have no genuine spark of Christianity left inside them, no higher ideals than in the age of the Trojan Wars—only then at least bold young warriors went forth, while now shrunken old men go into battle."⁵

But while he painted in black colors the catastrophic retribution which would follow in the wake of Western national greed, he observed that there might be nations, and still more individuals, who could escape from accompanying that downward course. And while he asserted that all the current clap-trap about constantly expanding material progress for everybody was both banal and physically impossible, he remained far

⁵*Vyestnik Evropy*, 1900, vol. 5, p. 412.

from attracted by the rival appeal of a new dark age, in which "vigorous young barbarians" would conquer and supplant the relatively civilized white races. He doubted whether that vaunted virgin strength existed any longer, except in Rousseau-esque imaginations. The yellow races were not younger, but far older than the white ones, and what about "the cannibal islanders who ate the explorer Cook?" Or could we soberly believe that African Negroes, nearer to the ancestral monkey, had been designed to revitalize a decrepit Western World?

Solovyov clung to the more tangible spiritual legacy of Europe, as the sole surviving force which might still raise human beings (whether of European ancestry or not) to a higher level, even though it could now rely on nothing more spectacular than the helpful efforts of a few good and gifted people.

In "The Secret of Progress" (1897), he introduces a fairy tale to illustrate the only kind of spiritual progress which he still believed to be worth having, and in order to make doubly sure, he emphasized the moral of this story. Contemporary man, in his hunt for fleeting pleasures, has strayed from the straight and narrow path. In front of him flows the dark and stormy current of life, which he must cross, while time, like the wood-pecker in the story, mercilessly counts the opportunities which he has missed. Behind him stands the sacred legacy of the past. Let him exert himself to carry this sacred burden across the present flood of history. Let him see clearly that there is no other way to end his wanderings.

Modern man, of course, no longer believes in fairy tales—so much the better. What right had he to inherit all the work of greater ages, when he did nothing to earn so many rich rewards by his own efforts? Even if he saw no profit in it for himself, could he not carry the burden of the old sanctity out of reverence for her age, pity for her decline, shame for his own cold ingratitude? Only if he saved her, could he save himself. That was the secret of any further progress, and there could be no other.

*Soviet Cultural Diplomacy Since Stalin**

By FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN

WITH the election of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States and the rise to power in the Soviet Union of Nikita S. Khrushchev a new phase began in the East-West struggle for control of vital political symbols. By far the most important of these symbols was "peace." With every advance in the development of death-dealing weapons, Moscow, London, and Washington redoubled their efforts to demonstrate the peacefulness of their intentions. Tourist travel, exchanges of scientific and artistic personnel and other cultural contacts were employed in this effort by both sides, although Washington's response to the challenge was probably somewhat sluggish in comparison with that of the Kremlin. Britain established a Soviet Relations Committee within the British Council in an effort to keep cultural exchange from becoming a monopoly of pro-Soviet groups such as the Anglo-Soviet Friendship Society. The United States set up an East-West Contacts Staff in the Department of State. The Soviet Union expanded the activities of Intourist and VOKS and in 1957 established a new State Committee for cultural exchange, primarily to control the activities of foreign journalists.

On neither side was cultural exchange regarded as merely a propaganda or even as simply a political activity. On the Soviet side, a redoubled effort was made to discover, assemble, and study foreign scientific, engineering, and administrative techniques and to assimilate into the Soviet economy whatever would be useful to the state. President Eisenhower was obvious-

*This article presents, in preliminary form, some of the material to be included in a book on Soviet foreign cultural policy which the author is now writing. [Ed.]

ly sincere in his belief that as a result of interchange of ideas, books, magazines, students, tourists, artists, radio programs, technical experts, religious leaders and government officials "little by little, mistrust based on falsehoods" would "give way to international understanding based on truth."¹ It is probable that both in Russia and the West there were high hopes for benefits from a genuine exchange of cultural values among intellectuals and creative persons in many fields. However, generous and spontaneous impulses on both sides were in large part chilled by ideological preconceptions, prejudices, and bureaucratic red tape.

There is abundant evidence that Khrushchev, and his Kremlin rivals and colleagues, considered it important to wrest from the United States the prestige associated with freedom of movement and freedom of exchange. Like a combination Peter the Great and soapbox orator Khrushchev rubbed elbows with princes, ministers, and peasants. In public speeches and interviews, particularly those most widely reported in foreign countries, the highest Soviet leaders enthusiastically endorsed "universal expansion of international contacts and relations." Almost every major Soviet political document since the death of Stalin has contained a statement stressing the value of "contacts" and "exchanges."

Soviet politicians are masters of pantomime. They are aware that the context of a communication is sometimes more important than its content. Hence it is not surprising that Stalin's successors displayed, perhaps, more interest in arranging and talking about exchanges of persons, than in the communication resulting from them. The fact that Prime Minister Nehru of India or President Sukarno of Indonesia visited Russia was probably more important to the Kremlin than anything said to or by these statesmen. Perhaps the photograph, reproduced on the glossy cover of the English-language magazine *USSR*, of President Eisenhower and Mr. Bulganin in smiling togetherness was one of Moscow's important achievements at the "summit" Conference of July, 1955.

¹Address accepting nomination for a second term, *The New York Times*, August 24, 1956.

The energetic pursuit of personal diplomacy dramatizes the Kremlin's professed belief in the value of cultural exchange. As one Western diplomat put it, after the death of Stalin the Russians became "ruthlessly friendly." Foreign statesmen who did not respond quickly to high-pressure persuasion were criticized for obstructionism. Mikoyan, in his speech at the 20th Party Congress made sport of alleged fear in Washington that some Soviet cooks and dieticians, whose visas had been held up, might overthrow the government of the United States.

It must be admitted that in the post-Stalin years Soviet leaders in every field devoted an impressive amount of time and energy to getting acquainted with foreign colleagues. Almost every issue of *Pravda* or *Izvestiya* contained from two or three to a half a dozen or more notices of receptions for distinguished foreigners. For example, *Pravda* for September 17, 1957, reported a lecture by an American virusologist under the auspices of the All-Union Society for Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge. The same paper for September 10 reported that Mr. Mikoyan had received Senator Ellender of Louisiana and that Mr. Gromyko had received Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt. *Sovetskaya Rossiya* for August 30 reported a reception in the Soviet Academy of Sciences for a leading Indian scientist and the departure of a number of Italian statesmen, invited by the Supreme Soviet.

Soviet officials, journalists, and intellectuals abroad make a determined effort to establish contact with foreign counterparts. The results can be embarrassing for the foreigners if they do not display the desired attitude toward Soviet objectives. For example, Soviet journalist Berezhkov, a member of a delegation that visited the United States in 1955, ridiculed Robert D. Murphy, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, for allegedly evading a straight answer to the question, "Don't you believe mutual visits of scientists, artists, actors, concert and dramatic troupes, would be useful?" Members of some Soviet delegations complained after they returned home that they were refused permission to meet persons of high rank. There is probably a measure of sincerity in these indignant complaints, since in the Soviet Union relatively low-ranking visitors find it easy to ar-

range meetings with *Pravda* editors, leading scientists, and sometimes even with government ministers and top Party leaders.

Soviet leaders have repeatedly insisted that their enthusiasm for international contacts of all kinds is proof of their dedication to world peace. This is an appealing thesis, for there can be no doubt that people everywhere associate friendly personal contacts with peaceful intentions. Almost all Soviet reporting and comment on cultural exchange associates it with "the struggle for peace," or with the "strengthening" or "consolidation" of peace. For example, Soviet Minister of Culture, N. Mikhailov, wrote in *Pravda* for April 2, 1956 that "the developing cultural relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain will undoubtedly contribute to the noble aims, common to both peoples, of consolidating peace and relaxing international tensions." The then *Pravda* correspondent in the United States, Litoshko, reported in his paper for September 1, 1955 that the exchange of agricultural delegations between the Soviet Union and the United States had contributed to "universal peace," and that even the "bourgeois" press had been forced, under the pressure of public opinion, to change its attitude toward the Soviet Union. After Howard Fast's denunciation of Moscow, it became a source of ironic amusement to read his ecstatic accounts, published in the Soviet press while he was (in Russia) the most honored of living American writers.

If the Soviet leaders believe in the doctrine which they require to be taught to all Soviet citizens in schools and universities, that cultural exchanges foster "peace" it is not entirely reassuring, at least not to anti-Communists. Since, as Khrushchev asserted in his published report to the 20th Party Congress, Communists are the leaders of the "struggle for the preservation of peace," and "for the vital interests of the working people and the national independence of all countries," it follows that "peace" as the Kremlin understands it, tends to become equivalent to the acceptance of Soviet policy goals.

Another important aim of Soviet cultural policy is dissemination throughout the world of a favorable image of Soviet "socialist" civilization. Moscow hopes and demands that Russia

be regarded as the chief world center of progress, spiritual cultivation, enlightenment, and humanitarianism. This intention is revealed, often indirectly, in statements by Soviet politicians and intellectuals. It is powerfully reinforced by publication in the Soviet press of glowing testimonials by foreigners. For understanding of the political significance attributed by the Soviet leadership to the popularization of Soviet culture abroad it is useful to understand the Soviet doctrine of the "cultural revolution." According to the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* the cultural revolution is an integral part of the socialist revolution. It is directed by the Communist Party. The Party effects the cultural revolution after it has seized political power. The Soviet conception of the cultural revolution is developed systematically in a book published in 1954 by G. G. Karpov, head of the government agency which supervises the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church. Karpov's point is suggested by his statement that "our country is the country of the most advanced culture, the citadel of advanced scientific thought, of revolutionary humanism and of a new, Communist morality." Karpov states that Soviet culture struggles against "bourgeois" culture, which is, he insists, "the chief obstacle to the progressive development of mankind." According to Karpov, Russian culture was always superior to that of the West, but only reached its full flowering after the adoption of Leninism, the summit of "Russian national and world culture." After the destruction of bourgeois culture, the chief support of which is American imperialism, a "truly unified and universal human culture" will be established "under conditions of socialism." Perhaps one might regard Karpov's apocalyptic vision as a kind of cultural concomitant to Khrushchev's boast that the Communists intended to "bury" what they call "capitalism."

A *Pravda* editorial on June 15, 1953 stated that visits of foreigners to the Soviet Union counteracted falsehoods disseminated by the capitalist press, and helped to make known the truth about Soviet industrial progress and the steadily improving life of the people. The Teacher's Newspaper (*Uchitelskaya Gazeta*) for April 21, 1954 reported ecstatic comments by Swiss school teachers on the Soviet educational system and in particu-

lar on the love of and care for young children. Perhaps particularly interesting is the effort made by Soviet leaders to cultivate cordial relations between Soviet and foreign motion-picture workers. This policy is pursued in many ways, such as holding "festivals" of foreign films in Russia and by arranging for joint Soviet-foreign film productions. An interesting detail on one aspect of this type of cultural diplomacy was contained in an article in *Pravda* for October 21, 1954, describing films shown in India by the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society, formed in 1951 by a group of Indian intellectuals who had just visited the Soviet Union. Commenting on "international ties of cinematography," *Soviet Culture* for January 8, 1955 stated that "progressive cinematography serves to bring nations closer together."

Khrushchev, in a speech to coal miners in 1956, revealed, perhaps, one of the motives for display of Soviet culture abroad and Moscow's desire for statements of approval by foreigners. He said: "The country's growing authority abroad is reflected in the flood of foreign delegations coming here." It is probable that if Soviet culture enjoyed, either at home or abroad, the prestige claimed for it, a less strident effort would be made to demonstrate its superiority. That Kremlin chauvinism regarding Soviet culture has not necessarily inspired contempt or hostility toward foreign culture in the Soviet public has often been revealed, as for example, in the riotous welcome which hundreds of thousands of Leningraders gave to the British and Dutch fleet visits in 1955 and 1956.

However, the Kremlin's expectation of gaining prestige abroad by skillful persuasion is certainly not entirely unfounded. During my trip to Russia in 1956 I saw evidence of its impact even on wealthy American businessmen. Partly because they had come to the Soviet Union with an almost grotesque image of Russian backwardness, and partly because they were shown the best that Moscow had to offer, some of these men were favorably impressed by much of what they saw. A British diplomat who remarked, "They've got their delegation technique working nicely," was convinced that a far more powerful impression was being made on more susceptible groups traveling in carefully shepherded isolation from the full impact of reality.

It is more likely, however, that the Communists reap their richest rewards, particularly in terms of the good will of foreign intellectuals, not by display of their own achievements but by courteous and sympathetic appreciation of those of other countries. Soviet leaders, including the not very polished Khrushchev, have demonstrated considerable sensitivity to the self-images of almost every kind of national and cultural group. They seem to realize more clearly than Americans or even Western Europeans that one of the most effective ways of flattering an individual is to express appreciation of his national language, literature, and art. Probably the skills employed by Soviet leadership in foreign cultural relations represent to some extent an external application of experience acquired in governing the multi-national Soviet state. The Soviet attitude toward foreign culture also probably draws somewhat on the eighteenth and nineteenth-century Russian tradition of avid interest in things foreign, particularly things European. At its best, this was a tradition of civilized cosmopolitanism. At times, however, even in the nineteenth century and more often in the Soviet period Russian interest in foreign cultures has been accompanied by the rather arrogant claim that Russians have a better understanding of foreign cultures than the natives of the countries concerned.

A succinct and appealing expression of Soviet appreciation of foreign cultures was made by Joseph Stalin in April, 1948. At a dinner in honor of a Finnish governmental delegation Stalin said:

Soviet people consider that each nation, whether large or small, has its special characteristics which belong to it alone. These characteristics represent the contribution which each nation makes to the general treasure chest of world cultures, and adds to it and enriches it. In this sense all nations, both great and small, are on the same footing and each nation is as significant as any other nation.²

If skillfully applied, this is a formula certain to win friends, particularly among peoples and groups that feel threatened by American "cultural imperialism," or have not overcome their resentment against "colonialism." The "underdeveloped" coun-

²*Vneshnyaya politika sovetskogo soyuza*, Moscow, 1950. Pt. I. p. 24.

tries, or as Khrushchev called them in his 20th Congress speech, the "poorly developed" countries, particularly those of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, offer a fertile field for Soviet cultural diplomacy. One of the major differences between post-Stalin strategy and that of the late Stalin era was the realization in the Kremlin that an appeal to nationalism and anti-Americanism might pay bigger political dividends, at least for a considerable time, than an attempt at early overthrow of "bourgeois" governments such as that of Nehru in India or Sukarno in Indonesia. This renewed attempt to woo not merely the "workers and peasants" of underdeveloped countries but also "progressive" elements of all classes, was one of the important features of the switch from "Stalinism" to "Leninism" in Soviet foreign policy. Like the Soviet "peace" policy it contains a substantial ingredient of deception. Cooperation with "neutralist" governments and appreciation of national cultures only thinly disguises the ultimate intention of imposing the Soviet system of government upon the "underdeveloped" countries.

Nevertheless, the Soviet effort has been rather successful, particularly of course in such countries as Syria and Egypt. An enormous volume of material in Soviet sources could be cited to illustrate methods employed in cultivating Asian, African, and Latin American intellectuals, statesmen, and masses. In 1953, before the post-Stalin bid for Asian friendship, a perceptive Indian editor wrote:

In a society where the artist or writer finds it difficult to live, even the smallest support of patronage assumes importance. In the last four years, Communist patronage of the arts has become a strong factor. Indian fiction is being translated and published in East European languages. Indian music put down in staff notation is being sent to Moscow and other Communist capitals. The Communist Party of India which arranges for such patronage to the artist is, thereby, able to win their allegiance.³

Elsewhere I have dealt with some of the highlights of Moscow's wooing of Asians and Africans up to the time of Prime Minister Nehru's very significant visit to the Soviet Union in

³Hamdi Bey, "The Indian Intelligentsia and the Western World." *New World Writing*, New York, 1953. 3rd Mentor Selection. p. 216.

May and June, 1955.⁴ This was followed by the well-known visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin to India, Burma, and Afghanistan in October and November, 1955. In January, 1957 came the visit of Marshal G. K. Zhukov. He arrived in a gleaming Soviet TU-104 jet transport. As he stepped from the plane he expressed admiration for India's "ancient and great culture." The *Hindu-stan Times* called him a "soldier of peace." This did not, however, prevent Marshal Zhukov from saying while in India that the Soviet Union had the capability of dropping bombs on any point on the surface of the earth.

In November, 1956, the Soviet Ministry of Culture and the Indian Ministry of Communications concluded an agreement on cultural exchange. In August of that year thirty-six Soviet artists had received "an unprecedented, record-breaking reception" from crowds in the Soviet Central Asian Republics. According to long and enthusiastic accounts in Soviet newspapers published in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, thousands of Soviet citizens gathered to demonstrate their "love, friendship, and sympathy" for the Indian guests, and for the Indian people. Besides performing in theaters, concert halls, and stadia, the Indian singers and dancers visited factories, collective farms, and educational and scientific institutions.

In November, 1956, there was held in Moscow a public ceremony in honor of the Indian national poet Kalidas. Comment by scholars stressed national and universal values in his legacy and traditional Russian interest in India. The Indian Ambassador, according to the Soviet press, stated in a public address in Moscow that the ceremony in honor of Kalidas was, "an example of the extraordinary breadth of the cultural and literary interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union." *Pravda* for September 5, 1957, carried a photograph and an article on the use of Soviet tractors in India. The authors of the article quoted an engineer of the Minsk tractor factory, recently returned from India, to the effect that the overwhelming majority of the Indian people regarded "Soviet man" as a bold innovator leading humanity to a happy future.

⁴See my article in *World Politics* for April, 1956.

The article on Soviet tractors in India stressed a theme which has been increasingly emphasized in the Soviet press in the last year or two, namely, appreciation on the part of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America for Soviet assistance in their economic and cultural development. Soviet appeal to the self-esteem of susceptible groups is many-sided. Amazingly enough, it even includes gestures to religious sentiments. *Izvestiya* for July 2, 1957 reported a pilgrimage of "Soviet Moslems" to Mecca, Medina, and Cairo, "where are located places sacred to Moslems."

Returning from Southeast Asia early in 1956, Grayson Kirk expressed concern regarding the expectations underlying the Soviet cultural advance. He observed that "to the degree that the leaders establish close rapport with the Russians they lose their ability to take strong measures to restrict and combat the activities of local Communist parties."⁵ It would be a gross oversimplification to attribute subsequent events such as the Communist electoral victory in the state of Kerala, India, or the big increase in Communist strength in the Javanese municipal elections to Soviet cultural diplomacy, but there may be some connection.

Perhaps the most obvious objective of the Soviet exchange program is acquisition of useful knowledge. After the death of Stalin, Soviet scientists and engineers were encouraged to alter their chauvinistic public view regarding foreign achievements to one which recognized the merits both of "fatherland" and of "foreign" science. Traces of scientific chauvinism remained, however, particularly in military circles. For example, the army newspaper, *Red Star*, for June 12, 1957, published an angry letter from distinguished air officers excoriating Soviet historians for sowing "seeds of doubt about our motherland's priority in building the world's first airplane."

However, these "Stalinist" notes, perhaps reflecting a resurgence of domestic and foreign tensions, were struck at a time when the post-Stalin program of scientific and technical exchanges was continuing to expand, particularly with the United States. Many top Soviet leaders, including Khrushchev and Bul-

⁵*The Saturday Review*, May 19, 1956, p. 69.

ganin, made public statements shedding light on Soviet motives for expanding scientific and technical exchanges. In a speech to the Supreme Soviet, a considerable part of which was devoted to urging Russian technical men to study Western methods, Bulganin said: "We cannot forget—and we do not have the right to—that technology in capitalist countries does not stand still, but, under the influence of the arms race and of the desire of capitalists for maximum profit, has, in a number of fields, moved ahead."⁶ Bulganin called for more frequent exchange of information with foreign scientists, increased purchases of foreign technical literature, and wider dissemination of such material in translations throughout the Soviet Union. He pointed out the inferiority of Soviet truck chassis to comparable American models and of Soviet tractors and portable generators to British and German models. *Soviet Culture* for September 8, 1955 declared in an editorial that it was the "patriotic duty" of Soviet publishing houses and other institutions to make available the achievements of world science and technology.

These injunctions were followed by a vastly increased effort in the publication of review journals, translations of foreign treatises, and abstracts. An American expert has written that the Soviet scientific abstract program "may be the most ambitious and comprehensive scheme in existence of this kind," and that the Soviet leadership "is making a conscious, well-planned attempt to assume the scientific leadership of the world."⁷ Apparently not satisfied that everything possible was being done to assimilate useful foreign information, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February, 1957 recommended the creation of a special commission to collect and spread technological information both from Russia itself and from foreign countries.

It is well known that Khrushchev has often called upon Soviet agricultural workers to "learn the best" from abroad. He sent Soviet agricultural experts on missions to the United States, Canada, Britain and other countries in 1955. When Vladimir

⁶*Pravda*, July 17, 1955.

⁷John Turkevich, "Soviet Science in the Post-Stalin Era," *The Annals*, Vol. 303, January, 1956, pp. 139-51. On this point see pages 149-150.

Matskevich, who subsequently became the Soviet Minister of Agriculture, returned from the United States in 1955 a 336-page book describing his trip was published under his name. The importance attributed to data obtained in the United States and Canada by the Soviet agricultural delegation was indicated by the fact that the political magazine, *Party Life*, devoted its only 1956 item on cultural exchanges of persons to a review of Matskevich's book. Having had this energetic, on-the-spot study of Western agricultural techniques made, and having introduced "corn-hog" agriculture, Khrushchev in 1957 announced a Soviet drive to catch up with the United States in per capita production of meat, milk, and fats. This slogan was less vague than Malenkov's 1953-1954 promise of "abundance within two or three years." It was also, perhaps, more demagogic, for nothing was said about the fact that something like half of the Soviet population is engaged in agriculture, compared with about 10 percent of the United States population.

Not all Soviet statements regarding scientific exchanges reflect a grasping utilitarian spirit. There are also perfectly unexceptionable statements such as the following published in the *Literary Gazette* for August 4, 1955:

The threads of mutual cultural relations may be compared to the blood vessels of culture. The breaking of these contacts leads to stagnation; science for its development requires the exchange of information regarding its newest discoveries, and the successes achieved by art and science are also better understood on a comparative basis.

There have been indications that Soviet scientists, as well as learned men in other fields, are capable, when permitted by their government, of taking a reasonable and cooperative attitude. The editor of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, commenting on a meeting of Soviet and Western atomic scientists at Pugwash, Nova Scotia, in 1957, stated:

With gratification one must record that, as scientists, they were all able—and willing—to set aside their emotional or political aims and settle down to factual, quantitative analysis of the radio-active contamination produced by test explosions.⁸

⁸Eugene Rabinowitch, "The Meeting at Pugwash," *The New Leader*, September 23, 1957, p. 13.

We can probably assume that even the Kremlin recognizes a mutuality of East-West interest in survival. We can be certain that there is a far wider and deeper area of mutuality of interests between Soviet and Western scientists, physicians, scholars, artists, and writers. This element of mutuality should be kept in mind in appraising the disturbing evidence of Soviet intransigence discussed in these pages.

With growing Soviet industrial progress the opportunities—and dangers—in the East-West encounter will increase. It has become increasingly clear in recent years that the West has much to learn from, as well as to teach, the Soviets. A striking indication of this trend was contained in a statement in *The Economist* for April 27, 1957. "Four or five years ago," wrote *The Economist*, "the fashion was for British industry to send productivity teams to the U.S.; in the last two years technical teams have been going to Russia."

One possible consequence of cultural exchange which is feared both by Russia and the West is the opportunity it may afford for espionage. This is part of the complicated problem of security in an age of super-weapons. High-ranking Soviet defectors such as former secret agents Yuri Rastvorov and Vladimir Petrov have testified regarding the use of cultural and athletic groups as a "cover" for espionage and subversion. Petrov, for example, wrote in the *Sydney Morning Herald* for October 10, 1955 that:

As well as consul, my open official duties included that of representative of VOKS, the Soviet cultural organization. In this way I had a chance to travel, meet people, and see the country, which my jealous colleagues greatly envied.

Even during the relatively relaxed period from the "summit" conference to the Poznan riots in June, 1956, the Soviet political press did not cease to publish occasional warnings that foreign tourists might, after all, be "imperialist spies." In the second half of 1956, and in 1957, the frequency and intensity of these warnings increased. The Kremlin was probably more concerned about the danger of influence of "alien" attitudes on Soviet citizens than about possible espionage. Soviet concern was indicated, for example, in an article by V. Moskovsky, in *Kommunist*, No. 12, August 1956, asserting that "the reactionary circles of

the West" would utilize every available means to "influence the consciousness of backward people" in the Soviet Union. Moskovsky called upon members of the Party to display an irreconcilable attitude to every "manifestation of bourgeois ideology." After the Sixth World Festival of Youth and Students in Moscow in 1957 Shelepin, head of the Communist Youth League, made some interesting statements. He expressed satisfaction that the Festival had "exposed slanderous distortions of reactionary propaganda regarding our country," fostered dissemination of truth regarding the Soviet Union, and its industry, culture, and political institutions in foreign countries. The Festival had also, he stated, demonstrated the organizing ability and ardent patriotism of Soviet youth. On the other hand, it was impossible for Soviet people to "agree with and fully accept what had been displayed at the Festival by certain delegations of youths from capitalist countries."

A number of Americans who were in Moscow during the Youth Festival have reported that Soviet youths who had established apparently spontaneous and unauthorized contacts with Western youths were instructed by Soviet authorities to cut off these contacts. (One such account was contained in the *New York Herald Tribune* for September 12, 1957.) An American participant in the Festival, George Abrams, reportedly said upon arrival in New York that "the Russians he met received him with great warmth and showed great curiosity about life in the United States and the West in general." In a letter to the *Washington Post* for September 4, 1957, Anthony Quainton wrote, "in spite of the fact that there were comparatively few articulate defenders of the Western way of life in the American delegation, the United States need not be ashamed of the achievements of its representatives." Abrams and Quainton deplored the fact that the American delegation had been both small and unrepresentative and they criticized United States Government policy, based, as Quainton put it, on "non-contamination," which he said, had thwarted the best interests of the United States. In the light of these apparently intelligent appraisals, it is perhaps fortunate that the British government, for example, did not discourage representative British youths,

including graduate students of Soviet affairs, from attending the Festival. On the whole, the Festival, like many similar Soviet efforts in recent years, probably accomplished its purpose of convincing the majority of the participants of the Soviet desire for peace and in presenting an attractive view of Soviet culture and life to a crucially important audience. It is interesting to note that Mr. Quainton referred to an estimate of 150 million dollars as the cost of the Festival to the Soviet Government.

If Soviet expectations are fulfilled, part of the credit or blame, will have to be attributed to Russian determination, adaptability, and energy. The whole campaign is an interesting example of the results that can be achieved by the systematic and coordinated use of science, scholarship, and learning for political purposes. Of course, its success must also be attributed in part to disturbed world conditions, which favor a professed "revolutionary" power, and, in particular, to widespread resentment against and misunderstanding of "imperialism," "colonialism," and "capitalism." But in part, also, such success as the Soviet campaign has achieved can probably be explained by Western indifference. One cannot cope successfully with an energetic competitor merely by reviling him.

Since we have been concerned here primarily with professed Soviet intentions, an excessively somber picture has perhaps been painted. An exchange of persons program can become a double-edged sword. The cultural missionaries sent out by the Kremlin may, to a greater extent than their rulers realize or could afford to admit, themselves become converts to strange faiths and philosophies. But if this is to happen the West must demand reciprocity in the exchange of information and ideas and must see to it that every possible opportunity be exploited to stimulate "Soviet man" into thinking for himself. As for the "uncommitted world," the challenge to scholarship, tact, and patience is perhaps even greater.

*From Alexander Blok's "Songs of the Lady Beautiful"**

Translated from the Russian

By ROBIN KEMBALL

I

Rest unavailing. The road steep and strait.
Light softly failing . . . I knock at the gates.
Worldly, my knock — aye, and strange to Thine ear,
Pearls cast about Thee, Thy presence austere.
Tall looms the turret. The gloam is now dead.
There, by the entrance, lay mysteries in red.
Who set the turret ablaze on the gloam?
What has She raised, the Tsarevna, Alone?
Gable-crest horses, abreast of the eaves,
Fling Thee back, each, the red flame it receives.
Azurewards, upwards, the cupola aspires.
Sombre blue windows, vermillion with fires . . .
Chapel-bells echoing, belfries a-ring.
Duskless, Thy raiment, and steeped in the spring.
Thou, is it, there, on the sundown, that waits?
Thou, lit the turret? Unfastened the gates?

December 28, 1903

* "The Songs of the Lady Beautiful" ("Stikhi o Prekrasnoi Dame")—preceded by the 70 poems of "Ante Lucem" and followed by 80 more belonging to "Crossroads" ("Rasputya")—form the core of Blok's Book the First. The 164 "Songs" proper extend from January 25, 1901 to November 7, 1902, and are divided into six chapters, preceded by the "Introductory" (here No. I)—the only poem to appear out of chronological order in the entire book. No. II, from the second chapter, expresses the poet's first *unmistakable* premonition of the dangers and torments the future held in store. No. III is from the fourth chapter—one which Blok himself later described as being of "primordial significance, both for the first book (as such) and the trilogy as a whole . . ." since it "illuminates for the first time the confused searchings of the first three

II

*The ponderous dreams of earthly world's awareness
Thou shakest from thee, longing, lovingly.*

VI. Soloviov

Presentiment of Thee . . . The years go onward winding –
All in one countenance – presentiment of Thee . . .
The skies are lined with fire – insufferably blinding;
I wait, in silence – *longing, lovingly.*
The skies are lined with fire – and soon to see Thy vision . . .
And yet I fear: Thy countenance will change,
And Thou awake my insolent suspicion,
Thy features, long familiar, shed for strange.
How I shall fall! – What galling depths shall draw me,
Not yet above these day-dreams' worldly chains!
How bright the skyline burns! Resplendence soon before me . . .
And yet I fear: Thy countenance will change.

June 4, 1901. S. Shakhmatovo

III

The day goes by. The last rays dwindle,
Setting the dusty road aflame.
Their red reflections, constant, mingle
In confluence with my candle's flame.
My night, with slowly clear complexion,
Flows out to meet that other one.
Let me not heed that red reflection –
For she, in very truth, will come.
And all that was beyond achieving
In morning, or the heat of day,
Will find fulfillment here, at evening,
At sundown, on the dusty way.

February 1, 1902

introductory chapters . . ." No. IV is striking for being the only poem in which the Lady Beautiful is specifically referred to by this name. No. V is the last of the "Songs" proper. Two days after this was written Blok asked for, and was granted, the hand in marriage of Lyubov Dmitrievna Mendeleva. With this, a new phase of the poet's life began and, with it, a new cycle of poems. No. VI represents the final, irrevocable, leave-taking, and forms the "Introductory" to Blok's Book the Second.

IV

In sombre churches, dutiful,
 I perform my humble rite.
 There await the Lady Beautiful
 In the red glow of ikon light.
 In the shadow of one tall column,
 I start at the creak of a door.
 Comes a face, resplendent, solemn —
 But Her image, a dream — no more . . .
 How I know those trimmings enfolding
 The majestic, Eternal *She!*
 High above, on the cornice mouldings,
 Smiles, fables, and dreams run free.
 Holy One — how kindly, those candles!
 How consoling, the light of Thy brow!
 Not a word, not a whisper . . . I tremble,
 But believe: Thou art Gracious — Thou.

October 25, 1902

V

So fearful for me to meet Thee,
 More fearful by far not to meet.
 Now I wonder at all things deeply,
 In all, see Thine impress writ.
 The street is all shadows in motion;
 Living, sleeping — I cannot define.
 On the church steps, I kneel in devotion,
 Not daring to look behind.
 Then hands are laid on my shoulders,
 But I have forgotten the names.
 My ears hear the bells once tolled us
 At great funerals, not long since.
 The low clouds, sullen and dreary,
 Fill even the church with their care.
 I know: Thou art here. Thou art near me.
 Here is nothing of Thee. Thou art there.

November 5, 1902

VI

Thou art far, in the fields — and for ever,
So — Hallowèd be Thy Name!
The red spears of the dusk run together,
And outstretch me their tips once again.

In the darkest of days I will only
Press my lips to Thy golden reed;
And if prayers tone away, then, lonely,
Fall asleep, oppressed, in the field.

I will lift up mine eyes no longer
When Thou passest in purple and gold.
Let me sigh in this dream-world's wonder,
Kiss the path Thy rays unfold.

Lay this soul, worn out to corrosion,
With the saints in a peaceful land,
Thou, that guardest both earth and ocean
With serene and delicate Hand!

April 16, 1905

The Tolstoy Foundation

By PAUL B. ANDERSON

ALEXANDRA Tolstoy has given us the best of two worlds. In the Tolstoy Foundation the Russian capacity for showing mercy has been combined with the organizing skill and flexible effectiveness which only an American voluntary agency can provide. The first is primary, and it is this obligation to render mercy which has carried the Foundation through moments of great anxiety and even crisis. No crisis, however, has prevented Alexandra Tolstoy and Tatiana Schaufuss from responding to the appeal of the helpless. The more difficult the case, the more complicated the situation, the greater the criticism—it simply meant that more quiet persistence had to be exerted. At all times the objective has been clear—to give a home to the homeless and to care for those who are unwanted.

This has been a humanitarian service of first quality. Even in numbers it is not insignificant, for what other private agency, without a previously established constituency, could on a shoestring bring nearly nineteen thousand refugees through the maze of screening and testing to these shores, and resettle them in American communities, where they are contributing to our economic, cultural and spiritual life?

The Foundation was incorporated April 26, 1939. Charter members were: Alexandra Tolstoy, Sophie Panina, Tatiana Schaufuss, Alexandra Graeves, Regina Kelley, Stella MacNaughten, Alexis Wiren, Serge Gagarin, Valerian Graeves, Andrey Maximov, Boris Sergievsky, and Boris Bakhmetieff. From the beginning, Alexandra Tolstoy has been President and Herbert Hoover, Honorary Chairman. Ethan T. Colton was temporary chairman of the Board, during the organizing period. Upon its establishment, Boris Bakhmetieff became Chairman of the Board, and remained its most trusted senior officer until his untimely death.

The formation of the Foundation preceded World War II and antedated the period which brought the term "Displaced Persons" into common use. Yet even in 1939 there was great need for such an organization to render humanitarian service among the many refugees and exiles of the Revolution whom fate had left in unmitigated distress. Some who had found homes in Germany and Czechoslovakia were again uprooted when the Nazi regime deprived them of freedom. During the first two years of its existence, therefore, the Foundation appealed for funds and reached out a helping hand to this group of Russian people.

In 1941 a wonderful event occurred, when the Foundation received as a gift from Mrs. Edward Harkness the estate known as Reed Farm, about three miles north of Nyack, New York. It was Allen Wardwell, friend of so many Russian-American undertakings, who arranged this splendid donation. Here was a large dwelling house, which at one time had been used as a convalescent home, two smaller houses, and a good collection of barns and sheds, on seventy-five acres of land. Visions of an American *Yasnaya Polyana* arose. Miss Tolstoy and Mrs. Schau-fuss soon had a flourishing agricultural unit as well as a cultural center with a summer camp for children and a home for the elderly. This is the "Farm" which has been the first home on American soil for so many thousands of homeless Russians. Additional buildings have been erected, each one the despair of the finance committee, but the confirmation of Miss Tolstoy's conviction that the Foundation must take care of people and people will take care of the Foundation. The first important addition to the property was a large two-story building, erected in 1951 to house displaced persons on their arrival.

Scarcely had this house been built when an unexpected use for a portion of it appeared. On Wednesday of Orthodox Holy Week fire broke out and destroyed the Chapel, which had occupied the largest room in the main house. Miss Tolstoy telephoned me in despair, wondering where to hold the Easter services. Recalling the many beautiful Orthodox chapels and churches installed by Russian refugees in garages, sheds, and even cellars in Western Europe, I immediately proposed holding

the services in the still unfinished basement of the new building.

The recently arrived D.P.'s were adept at meeting this kind of emergency. In two days a stone floor was laid, a panel to hang the rescued Holy Images for the iconostasis was built, and a few planks provided a base for the altar. Those of us who participated in that Easter Eve service and the midnight Liturgy can never forget the experience. It was Holy Russia in America. The rude surroundings only emphasized the beauty of the singing by an unrehearsed choir. The tapers were at once a necessity, for there was no electricity, and a symbol of the earthly becoming heavenly. And when the celebrant read the sermon of St. John Chrysostom, it was no mere repetition, since it has been done every year since the sixth century, but the voice of the Church giving the glorious assurance that "even at the eleventh hour" God's mercies are there for the asking.

In November, 1957, the new church, dedicated to St. Sergius of Radonezh, was consecrated. It is of the Pskoff-Novgorod style, rising with pure white walls and a copper cupola. It was built in recognition of blessings received, to offer supplication for those thousands of homeless in Europe, Asia, and Africa, who still need assistance, and to pray for the people of Russia that they may some day be free.

On the same occasion, in November, the Foundation dedicated the new buildings to provide residence for persons in old-age retirement. Miss Tolstoy likes to tell of the origin of this undertaking. One of the members of the Foundation in Los Angeles, who knew of the great need, but who also was aware of the chronic shortage of funds, proposed that an account be opened into which interested persons might deposit fifty cents a month, with which the Foundation might eventually establish an old people's home. At this writing these tiny deposits have brought in a total of thirty-six thousand dollars. Such is the wide spread and the devoted interest of those who have enjoyed the hospitality of Tolstoy Foundation Center. There is room for twenty-four persons in the new house, and for thirty more in the former "D.P." house. The main building continues in use for new arrivals in transit. With the opening of the new church, the basement of the D.P. house made a

combination library, lecture and concert room for the Russian community.

The farm itself is of great help. Currently the livestock count is 4,000 chickens, 13 hogs, and 6 cattle. Miss Tolstoy is particularly partial to chickens. Management of the whole complex is in her hands. She is assisted by persons technically qualified for agriculture, bookkeeping, household management, and the education of children, together with Father Michael Jelenevsky as priest and spiritual director, and Miss Tolstoy's two permanent associates, sister Xenia Rodzianko and Martha Knutson. When you come to the Center it is like visiting a family rather than an institution. Everyone is made to feel at home, and scores of visitors come for meals every Sunday. Borshch is made from home grown beets and cabbage, with *smetana*, pickles from the farm's own cucumbers and tomatoes, and *kisel* for dessert.

Living at Nyack were John C. Traphagen, then President of the Bank of New York and for fifteen years the Foundation's Treasurer, and Crawford Wheeler of Chase Bank, both permanent residents in Rockland county. They had met Miss Tolstoy and other members of the Tolstoy family when they were with E.T. Colton and the writer, among others, doing YMCA service in Russia during World War I. The Foundation owes much to their loyalty and help. Too much credit cannot be given to two other members of the Board, Boris Sergievsky and Vadim Makaroff, whose devotion and inspiration to others have added immeasurably to the Foundation's work.

After the death of Boris Bakhmetieff, the Board was fortunate in having General Albert C. Wedemeyer as Chairman for four years. He was succeeded by Igor Sikorsky in 1955. The Chairman of the Executive Committee is J. Donald Kingsley; other members are; James Brunot, Vadim Makaroff, Serge Obolensky, Boris Sergievsky, Canon Edward N. West and Col. Ilia Tolstoy, Alexandra Tolstoy's nephew.

While the Executive Committee finds that Reed Farm is no small undertaking, its chief attention must be given to the Overseas Program. This began in earnest when, in 1947, the Episcopal Church helped to send Tatiana Schaufuss to Europe for three months as Tolstoy Foundation representative attached

to the Church World Service, the overseas service program of the National Council of Churches of the U.S.A. Her job was to assist the Church World Service in processing Russian displaced persons for resettlement, and on welfare work in the refugee camps. In 1952 the Tolstoy Foundation began operating alone as an independent agency, having its own direct relationships with governmental, intergovernmental, and voluntary agencies. On September 23, 1957, when Tatiana Schaufuss celebrated ten years of service abroad, her responsibilities had grown to the supervision of a million dollar a year operating budget, with headquarters in Munich, Germany, and fourteen offices in nine other countries: Austria, Italy, France, Belgium, Iran, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. Temporary offices have operated also in Brazil and England, and there is a model reception center at Karlsfeld, near Munich.

The range of activities of this organization is not easily defined, for it embraces all that needs to be done in humanitarian and Christian service for the tens of thousands of Russian people deprived of home and passport protection. The Foundation has worked in close cooperation with all the intergovernmental agencies in this field, often on contract for handling resettlement or for welfare service.

A highly significant aspect of its work has been the care of defectors, persons who have found as much suspicion as welcome on the part of representatives of Western democracies. Here is need for personal attention, human understanding, interpretation between "processing officers," who necessarily work without favor, if not with evident suspicion, and these newcomers are sensitive because they insist they have come in good faith. For six years the Foundation has helped them with highly professional social-service skill to come out of a wandering void into useful citizenship. Many have been the human dramas played out in this service, and great must be the appreciation of individuals concerned as well as of our nation for the patient wisdom shown by Tatiana Schaufuss and her associates.

Trieste is another place of near-desperation. Here have been concentrated the thousands of Russians who found refuge in Yugoslavia after the Revolution, but who are not compatible

with Tito's regime. Their position is complicated in the same way as that of the Chetniks, who fought against the Nazis, but also against the Communists and therefore are charged by Tito with helping the Nazis. Where do such persons stand under United States immigration registration? In just this position where the "Kellerberg" men, forced into service by the Nazis, and therefore in ambivalent position in processing for resettlement. To Alexandra Tolstoy and Tatiana Schaufuss is due the gratitude of hundreds if not thousands for their intelligent, persistent, and indeed courageous defense of humanitarism principles in dealing with these cases.

There has been constant concern also for those who, because of age or ill-health, cannot hope for resettlement with "job assurances" or with other grounds for earning a livelihood. The Foundation could not leave this problem untouched, but it must be added that it could not have anticipated the wonderful results achieved. When Mrs. Schaufuss tackled it, her goal was high—"to marry" the inter-governmental capital funds for "hard core cases" with French, Belgian, and German humanitarian funds for the aged and infirm. She achieved complete success. In 1953, in cooperation with the World Council of Churches and the help of the Swiss Evangelical Church, the first home was opened, in Cannes, for 100 persons, with others subsequently established bringing the current total to 230. This is a drop in the bucket, but the Foundation has pioneered in this field for other agencies which have benefited by its initiative and experience, to win the eternal gratitude of those moved from the drab hopelessness of barracks life to the comfort and cheer of a well-serviced *maison-de-retraite*.

Yet the job is not ended. The case-load as of June 30, 1957 is 13,868. This must be seen against the number already brought to the United States — 18,082 from Europe, 215 from China, and 633 from the Middle East. The task is now more formidable, as our immigration laws tend to return to the strict quota basis, with little or no exception in favor of political refugees, the group to which the Foundation's case load belongs. In these circumstances the job gets harder, and the energies and ingenuity of Tatiana Schaufuss and her staff must become greater.

How has all this been financed? Miss Tolstoy would say, by a miracle, and indeed miracles have happened, sometimes a large, unexpected gift, sometimes a "widow's mite." All have been accepted with gratitude and used to the utmost value. Many different ways have been used to raise money, but none has been so effective as the personal appeal of Alexandra Tolstoy or Tatiana Schaufuss or of the devoted members of the Board of Directors. The work could not have reached its great extent without the funds provided under contract from the International Refugee Organization, the Inter-governmental Committee for European Migration, the United States Escapee Program, and similar agencies. Welfare services, amounting to a value of more than two hundred thousand dollars a year, providing food, clothing, and other material aid, have been made possible by support from the Swiss Hilfswerk der Evangelischen Kirchen der Schweiz, U.S. Agricultural Surplus, CARE, the Swiss Foster Parent Plan, the Russian Orthodox Greek-Catholic Church of North America, the Russian Children's Welfare Society of New York and Philadelphia, the Ruling Archbishop and Diocesan Council of the Russian Orthodox Church, New York, and private donors.

The Foundation has a permanent place in American life. One may ask about the future, when the refugee problem is settled. More than once this has been discussed. The answer is partly found in the new home for retired persons and the new Church. Miss Tolstoy longs also for decent stacks and reading tables for the splendid collection of 15,000 volumes of English and Russian books, many rare volumes, now in boxes at the Farm. Parents continue to press for expansion of the summer camp, and many would like the Foundation to resume its year-round hostel for boys and girls, who could go to the excellent public schools in Valley Cottage and Nyack. But above all, there is need for the continued working together of men and women who combine Russian genius and humanitarianism, as displayed by Alexandra Tolstoy, and integrate it with the freedom and pioneering spirit of American life. Welded together they hold rich promise for both America and Russia.

Book Reviews

COUNTS, GEORGE S. *The Challenge of Soviet Education*. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1957. 331 pp. \$6.00.

Recently, Americans have become more aware of a formerly unsuspected phase of the Soviet challenge to their society and culture, the challenge of Soviet education. Bluntly stated, at the present time, "Soviet vocational, technical and higher schools are graduating each year two or three times as many specialists as the corresponding institutions in the United States." If it comes to a showdown between the Soviet Union and the United States, this fact might be of decisive importance.

The book under review does not contain any new revelations, but it sets forth a new challenge as part of the total educational system of the Soviets, itself rooted in the doctrine which guides and sometimes obsesses the leaders of the Communist society established in Russia. The educational program of the Soviets is shown to be a most comprehensive and sustained effort to mold, in a specified way, the minds of the people, with the ultimate goal of world Communism.

After surveying the roots and the goals of Soviet education, the author devotes three excellent chapters to the general, political, and "moral" education of the younger generation, the latter meaning the inculcation of Soviet patriotism, collectivism, and conscious discipline. A special chapter describes the training of the specialists and another

the transformation of the intellectual class. Professor Counts correctly emphasizes that the present-day intellectuals are by no means spiritual heirs of the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia.

There follow three chapters on the political education of the people, the re-education of the offenders, and the political education of the soldiers. These are necessary to inform the reader about the educational plan in its totality, but contain only abridged reports about the corresponding activities of the Soviet government. The chapter on the re-education of the offenders could perhaps have been omitted; re-education has always existed more on paper than in actuality, and the procedures involved may be better considered as a branch of the terroristic than of the educational function.

In general, the book offers an exceptionally clear and well integrated survey of the topic. It is based on full command of published material supplemented by the author's personal observations during his many trips to the Soviet Union.

The present reviewer would, however, disagree with the importance ascribed by the author to Peter Tkachev as the inspirer of the Soviet plan (although his influence on Lenin is undeniable) and with his attempts to discover relevant resemblances between Soviet society and Plato's ideal society. And, on many occasions, the author makes unfair comparisons of the

present with the past because he takes for granted what he found in Soviet sources. He does not mention, for example, the reform of the *katorga* (penal servitude) which took place in 1900 and made it comparable with analogous penal devices of the West. He also ignores the arduous fight against illiteracy conducted by the *Zemstvos* since the 1860's and the ten-year plan passed by the Duma in 1908 and 1910. These efforts lifted the index of literacy (of persons above the age of 10) from 28 in 1897 to 42 in 1914 and, if uninterrupted by war and revolution, would have achieved the ideal of universal elementary education by 1921 while, under the Soviets, the goal was reached only in 1931. On the other hand, Professor Counts exaggerates the number of labor camp inmates. Figures which he quotes would mean that 20 to 40 percent of the adult males were incarcerated, which is sheer impossibility.

N. S. TIMASHEFF

Fordham University

TREADGOLD, DONALD W. *The Great Siberian Migration*. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1957. 278 pp. \$5.00.

Members of the Russia in Asia Project of the University of Washington are continuing to make substantial contributions to American knowledge of Russia's Eastern Empire. Forming a part of this project, Professor Treadgold's book is a scholarly and detailed analysis of a difficult and involved topic that has occasioned much controversy—Siberian immigration, its causes, and its effect on the larger problem of Russian agriculture. The book is

attractively printed and contains illustrations, maps, appendices, bibliography, and index.

Its subtitle is "Government and Peasant in Resettlement from Emancipation to the First World War," and the author has carefully limited his analysis to these two topics in this specific period. The book is divided into five parts. Part I deals briefly with Siberia prior to Emancipation, emphasizing that Cossacks and peasants fleeing serfdom already formed the bulk of the population,—the notion of Siberia solely as a land of exiles and political prisoners is erroneous. This is followed by an analysis of the status of the peasants in European Russia, which stresses the fact that it was not lack of land, as is so often supposed, but inefficient methods of farming that led the peasants to regard emigration to Siberia as desirable.

The second part discusses the government's attitude toward emigration after Emancipation. The government attempted to anticipate the movement of the migrants with a series of controls, but they proved to be for the most part ineffective. Legislation usually failed to overtake the peasant, who had often reached his new Siberian home before the government had given him permission to move there. This section also treats in detail the movement of the immigrants across the Urals to their new homes, and describes the conditions under which they moved, what they found upon their arrival, and how they adapted themselves to conditions on the frontier.

Part III deals with the Trans-Siberian railway and the effect this new and improved method of transportation had upon immigra-

tion. The Committee on the Trans-Siberian was a very important one and migration was one of its special concerns. It therefore commissioned an official, A. N. Kulomzin, to make a report on the condition of the migrants. Kulomzin, who was himself keenly interested in this matter, travelled in Siberia in 1896; this section, describing the movement of the migrants by rail and the various types of settlements they formed, is composed chiefly of extracts from Kulomzin's report.

The movement of so large a group of agricultural peasantry, the class that comprised the bulk of Russia's population, had repercussions in government circles.

Part IV first analyzes government reaction to the phenomenon of Siberian migration, particularly the views on it expressed in the successive Dumas, and then the attitude of the intelligentsia. Official debates and quarrels between the Left and Right had little effect on immigration; the peasants continued to flock eastward and only the shock and dislocations caused by the First World War and the Bolshevik Revolution finally managed to check them. Part V underlines the remarkable changes that some fifty years of heavy immigration brought to Siberia and gives the author's conclusions.

This book possesses a strong organic unity, which can be attributed in large measure to the fact that it is written to support a specific theory. The author's thesis is that desire for private property was a fundamental characteristic of the Russian peasant. With the aid of numerous statistical charts he points out that a steady revolution in the nature of land tenure, involving a decline in the influence

of the commune, had substantially increased the number of peasant private holdings even in European Russia. Siberia had made still greater progress in this direction because the commune and gentry land-holding, the two forces retarding peasant private initiative, had never obtained a strong foothold there.

The name of Peter A. Stolypin, Prime Minister from 1906 to 1911, is prominent in this study, because his legislative activity was aimed at assisting the peasants to acquire individual plots of land. In this Stolypin was apparently helping them to act in accordance with a little-known economic theory of the early twentieth century. Certain young Russian economists had formulated a theory of "peasant enterprise." They stated that a peasant working his own land without hired labor could supply his own needs and produce a surplus to be sold at a profit. Although operating within a capitalist economy, the peasant himself was not a capitalist, since he employed no hired labor. This theory, based on statistics on peasant farming compiled by interested local zemstvos, was advanced by V. A. Kosinsky, A. N. Chelintsev, N. Makarov, and A. V. Chaianov, among others, but had not sufficient time to develop, since the Bolsheviks, who held very different views, took measures to suppress it.

The sources cited in the footnotes and Bibliography include a number of pertinent works in English and French as well as Russian. Many basic articles are supplied from two important periodicals, *Aziatskaya Rossia* and *Voprosy Kolonizatsii*. The author also utilizes two sources favorable to the theory of

peasant private enterprise. In 1910 Stolypin and his capable assistant A. V. Krivoshein made a personal inspection trip to Siberia to evaluate the land reform on the spot and reported favorably on their progress. To answer questions on immigration posed in the Third Duma another survey was made by a government department under the supervision of V. K. Kuznetsov, and the results of this survey, made in 1911 and 1912, were also favorable to Stolypin's reforms. Long extracts from both these documents appear in the text.

The author believes that if the peasants had been entirely free to consult their own interests, they would have constrained the government to regularize peasant private property on an unprecedented scale. The War and the events of 1917 have made it impossible to tell what would have been the final outcome of the Stolypin reforms. Perhaps it is true that the peasants wished to abolish the commune and find a solution for the age-old problems of Russian land tenure that would have resulted in the creation of American-type peasant farms—it is significant that allusions to the developments on the American frontier frequently occur in the book. Although views may differ on the ultimate validity of its thesis, the book is a mine of interesting and valuable information and contains a wealth of detailed material. It should be welcome to all who are interested not only in Siberia but also in the very complex problem of Russian agriculture as a whole.

HUGH F. GRAHAM
University of New Mexico

EUDIN, XENIA JOUKOFF; FISHER, HAROLD H.; JONES, ROSEMARY BROWN (in collab). *Soviet Russia and the West, 1920-1927; A Documentary Survey*. Stanford University Press. 1957, 450 pp. \$10.00.

EUDIN, XENIA JOUKOFF and NORTH, ROBERT C. *Soviet Russia and the East, 1920-1927; A Documentary Survey*. Stanford University Press. 1957, 478 pp. \$10.00.

The publication of the above companion volumes by the Hoover Institute and Library of Stanford University is to be welcomed by all who seek a better understanding of Soviet foreign policy, past and present.

The two documentary surveys relate to Soviet foreign policy during the years 1920-1927—a period for which there is a marked paucity of source-material in English. The only existing general study of this period, by Louis Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs, 1917-1929* (2 v., 1930 and 2nd ed. 1951) has a pro-Soviet bias and is out-of-date. The story covered by the two volumes under review depict the genesis of Soviet policy of "co-existence" and is consequently of particular relevance today.

Drawn largely from the Hoover Library's own collections, the documents have been translated into English and arranged chronologically, under subject headings with introductory statements providing the necessary historical settings and tying the narrative into a connected whole.

In the Preface to the volume on the West the authors-editors state that in selecting the material they were guided by the following con-

siderations: 1) to illustrate the principal events of Soviet relations with Europe and Asia, 2) to bring out the Communists' analysis of these events, and 3) to show how the Communist leaders explained their policies to the Party and the Soviet public at large.

The bulk of the excerpts composing the two volumes are from official Soviet sources: reports and resolutions of the Supreme Soviet, the Party, the Comintern, Soviet newspapers, texts of treaties, and diplomatic correspondence. In the case of the volume on the East, official records of Soviet diplomacy were combined with documents showing extra-legal, subversive activities of the Comintern and the Russian Communist Party throughout Asia, thus illustrating the basic principles which have guided the Russian Communists in their relations with Eastern peoples to this day.

Three strong impressions emerge from the perusal of these documentary data: 1) the duplicity of the two-edged Soviet policy; 2) the persistence of the Communists' ultimate goal of world revolution, in spite of tactical shifts and changes in revolutionary strategy dictated by the events; 3) the basic hostility of Soviet leaders towards the United States and the various plans for European unity.

The NEP was a temporary, strategic retreat. As Lenin said, in 1922, "It was necessary in order to get a better run for our longer leap forward." By the middle twenties the Communist leaders realized the failure of a *frontal* attack on Western capitalist powers and their "rear" (i.e. their Asiatic colonies), and consequently developed the policy of "peaceful co-existence,"

without, however, abandoning their ultimate objective of world Communist revolution. As it was stated then: "The globe was divided into two camps: in the one camp we find the U.S.S.R. and revolutionary China; in the other, the entire capitalist world . . . the struggle [for China] will . . . continue until the world proletariat puts an end to the rule of the international bourgeoisie."

While systematically undermining the Western powers through the Communist International, the Soviet leaders, through the department of Foreign Affairs, entered into normal diplomatic relations with these powers, attended conferences at Genoa, The Hague, Lausanne, Rapallo, etc., professing peace and offering plans for disarmament. Simultaneously, with these professions of peace, the Fourth Congress of the Comintern (November-December, 1922) proclaimed the necessity of supporting "by every available means the national-revolutionary movement directed against imperialism."

Interesting sidelights could be found on the development of Moscow's view of America as a citadel of imperialism. These may be illustrated by the documents dealing with the Dawes Plan, (1924) and Count Coudenhove-Kalergi's pan-European movement, both of which the Communists strongly disapproved. "American capital," said Trotsky, "is seeking world hegemony; it seeks to establish an American imperialist autocracy on our planet." And the Soviet historian Tanin pointed out that the Americans are trying to "trap" Europe in its web of economic and political enslavement.

In the historical introduction to

Soviet Russia and the West the editors emphasize the messianic aspect of the pre-revolutionary foreign policy of Russia, indicating the many points of resemblance to Lenin's revolutionary program. To this reviewer this frequently-made assertion seems unconvincing. The earliest manifestation of messianic ideas, the doctrine of "the Third Rome," actually did not have much influence on the foreign policy of the Moscow state, and, in the nineteenth century, pan-Slavism was never an official doctrine of the imperial government. Moreover, the Tsars had no comintern at their disposal.

The Selections of the documents are skillfully made, the translations are excellent, and the introductory statements provide clear expositions of backgrounds and settings. Each volume is provided with a chronology, bibliography, and index. The volume on the East has, in addition, brief biographical notes on some of the Soviet and Asiatic Communist leaders, not readily accessible elsewhere.

DIMITRI VON MOHRENSCHILD
Dartmouth College

ALEXANDROV, VICTOR. *Khrushchev of the Ukraine*. New York, Philosophical Library, 1957. 216 pp. \$4.75.

This is a biography of the present dictator of the U.S.S.R. as well as a valuable running chronicle of the events and personalities related to the rise to power of this *enfant terrible* of the ruling clique of the Soviet Empire. The story ends with Khrushchev's victory in his struggle for control of the party machine

which ended in Moscow on June 29, 1957, with the condemnation of "the anti-party" heresy of Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Shepilov.

The academically-minded specialist would have liked to see several facts supported by documentary evidence; such statements as "Reported by the Yugoslav press" are much too vague for the more demanding specialist. In fact, the author, a Russian-born former correspondent of the *Soir de Bruxelles*, now a United States citizen, nowhere indicates specifically the core of his sources, although the blurb states that "apart from public sources, much of the information in this biography is derived from a former Soviet diplomat who was 'brought up' with Khrushchev, and was a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Ukraine at the same time as the latter." One also wonders about the authenticity of the numerous reports of Khrushchev's conversations, supposedly having taken place from his youth to his meetings with Tito. Here and there, the author lets his enthusiasm run away with him; for instance: "Stalin had bequeathed a totalitarian regime to his heirs. The Khrushchev Report marked the beginning of an irreversible process in the politics of the U.S.S.R. This was the process of democratization" (p. 151). Is Alexandrov joking or did he simply forget to put the word "democratization" in quotation marks?

The discerning reader will learn much from this work, but he will learn far more if he preserves a somewhat critical and analytical attitude. For, this is in some respects a superficial book, though readable and stimulating, and full

of facts which are directly related to the headlines of today.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

University of Bridgeport

GRULIOW, LEO. (Ed.) *Current Soviet Policies-II: The Documentary Record of the 20th Communist Party Congress and its Aftermath*. New York, Praeger, 1957, 247 pp. \$6.00.

Many libraries and teachers will be grateful to Mr. Gruliov and the Joint Slavic Committee for making easily accessible these translations from the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* pertaining to the 20th Communist Party Congress and its aftermath. This volume opens with eulogies of Stalin delivered on the occasion of the late dictator's seventieth birthday several years prior to the 20th Congress by such figures as Malenkov, Mikoyan, Molotov, and Khrushchev. Excerpts from all of the speeches made during the 20th Congress are not included in this collection of documents, but comparison with the official Russian stenographic notes of the 20th Congress published by the Russian Communist Party in 1956 will reveal that Gruliov has omitted little that would be of interest to the American reader. The immediate repercussions of the Congress at home and abroad are illustrated by the inclusion of representative documents concerning such new developments as law reforms, the execution of Bagirov, and Soviet relations with Poland and Yugoslavia.

The central point of interest in these documents is of course Khrushchev's dramatic condemnation of the cult of the individual

and of Stalin's use of "mass terror against the Party cadres" in his secret speech of February 25, 1956. In the process of making this condemnation, Khrushchev also rejected Stalin's thesis that class war had to be intensified as the Soviet Union marched forward toward socialism. Of equal interest is the new party line, formulated in an earlier Khrushchev speech at the Congress, that war is no longer inevitable because of the strength of the socialist camp and the strong movement for peace in a number of non-socialist countries. And perhaps even more striking than the changes in the official line is the difference in tone and emphasis that can be detected between the 19th and 20th Congresses. There still is, it is true, ample boasting about the achievements of socialism, but there is also a new and realistic willingness to admit frankly certain shortcomings of the Soviet economy as compared with selected aspects of the economies of the more advanced capitalist countries.

EDWARD C. THADEN

The Pennsylvania State University

LEDNICKI, WACŁAW. *Bits of Table-Talk on Pushkin, Mickiewicz, Goethe, Turgenev, and Sienkiewicz*. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1956. 263 pp. 17.75 guilders.

Professor Lednicki here offers a miscellany of scholarly commentary, devoted to selected subjects in Polish and Russian literature. The essays which make up the book have all been published before, in various places and at varying times (between the time before World War II and 1954). The phrase in

the title "Bits of Table Talk" advises the reader that the chapters will range freely from one subject to another and that within any chapter the author may feel free to digress and, indeed, to proceed for as long a time as he wishes without having any specific thesis to prove. In this latter respect, the chapters vary in spirit; as the book proceeds the discussions become somewhat less pointed, although still frequently polemical in character: each of the first four chapters, for example, which deal with Pushkin and with Turgenev, has a thesis to present, whereas chapters on Mickiewicz and Sienkiewicz have a less definite point to argue.

Even within so informal an organization it is difficult to understand why the list of names in the title does not follow the order of chapters. The ten chapters are as follows: I. The Prose of Pushkin; II. *The Snowstorm*; III. *The Nest of Gentlefolk* and the "Poetry of Marriage and the Hearth"; IV. Pushkin's "Monument"; V. Adam Mickiewicz: Poland's Romantic Ambassador to the Court of Realism; VI. Mickiewicz at the Collège de France; VII. Ex Oriente Lux (Mickiewicz and Pushkin); VIII. Pushkin's "Tazit" and Mickiewicz's "Konrad Wallenrod"; IX. Goethe and the Russian and Polish Romantics; X. Henryk Sienkiewicz (1846-1946).

This is the table talk of an erudite scholar. Yet the comments are sprightly and engaging and unburdened by tiresome pendency. And if we follow the spirit of the device of table talk we will be willing to listen in a conversational mood to the author's sometimes dogmatic statements of personal judgment and preference and fre-

quent references to his own published works. Where he has a definite case to argue, as in "Pushkin's 'Monument,'" he is completely convincing; and in the process of the argument we are usually impressed by his wit and insight as well as by his wide-ranging references. In the printed word, however, there is a demand for consecutiveness that real table talk need not be halted by. In the midst of a precise discussion of Pushkin, the reader comes upon the sentence: "When one reads Pushkin's poems about the poet, about the poet's immanent spirit of independence, about his longing for solitude and his devotion to the Muses, one may easily imagine how pleased he would have been if he had known (I don't know that he didn't) the beautiful poem of Jan Kochanowski, 'The Muses'". Whereupon follows not only Kochanowski's poem in translation, but a continuing discussion of Kochanowski—although we were presumably talking about Pushkin. In real table talk we might be quick to suspend our interest in Pushkin (perhaps we were tired for the moment of talking about him anyway) and hear about some other poet; but in a chapter in a book (or in a lecture, in which form this chapter was originally presented) such a digression is liable to confuse or even to irritate.

Nor should the light phrase "table talk" mislead the reader from knowing that the author is very serious about his topics, that he will not hesitate, for example, to use a weighty phrase like "the metaphysical significance" of Pushkin or Turgenev (p. 80); or that what seems like informal scholarly chatting is also designed by the author as an exercise in comparative Slavic

and European literature (even to the point of strain, as in a reference to "Dantesque symbolism" in Turgenev (p. 80)). The reader should also be aware that the chatty author is at the same time an adroit polemicist, making hidden *coups*, as when he scorns Léger's statement that "he never knew anyone who read the *Slavic Literature* of Mickiewicz" (p. 145) and then goes on unobtrusively to prove that Mickiewicz has had at least one reader—by proceeding to expound the con-

tents of Mickiewicz's lectures.

Surely the best service this book performs is to let us hear such serious, often argumentative, sometimes impassioned table talk from a Slavic scholar who really knows the world in which he moves and who can transmit to those of us who, in these times must still remain foreigners to it, some of the richness of its cultural tradition.

HERBERT E. BOWMAN
University of Oregon

BOOK NOTICES

ALEXANDROVSKY, GEORGE B. *Tsushima Boy (The Battle of Tsushima)*. New York, Rossiya Publishing Company, 1956. 320 pp. \$3.25.

The literature on Tsushima, one of the greatest naval battles of this century, is not extensive. Aside from the official Russian and Japanese versions of the battle there is the well-known book *Rasplata (The Reckoning)*, by Captain V. Semenov, who took part in the engagement, the work of a Russian Balt, Frank Theiss (*The Voyage of Forgotten Men*), and the book by a former non-combatant sailor, the Communist writer Novikov-Priboy. The latter, written according to the Marxist line during the Stalin era, is unreliable and biased. The book by Alexandrovsky is a rich collection of testimonials and reminiscences of officers who took part in the battle and who survived not only the battle but the Revolution of 1917. The volume is a valuable contribution to the understanding of the battle of Tsushima.

A.T.

FARRELL, R. BARRY. *Jugoslavia and the Soviet Union 1948-1956*. Hamden, Conn., The Shoe String Press, 1956. 220 pp. \$5.00.

This survey "in analysis and the documents of some of the major aspects of Jugoslav foreign relations from 1948 to 1956," which stresses "the role of the Soviet Union in Jugoslav political calculations," says very little that is new, but, at

the same time, it is a good and orderly summary of Tito's tightrope act between East and West. Most valuable, actually, is the collection of documents in the latter part of the volume making available Jugoslav and other source materials for analysis of trends in Jugoslav policies. The author's analysis does not always deliver the full punch since he is full of admiration for Tito. The conclusion that "perhaps Marshal Tito and other Jugoslavs may serve for the betterment of international relations by mediating some of the differences between the Soviet Union and the United States to the satisfaction not only of the great powers but of the smaller nations as well" is of doubtful validity. Also unduly optimistic is the statement that the Jugoslav leaders concluded by mid-1956 "that a resurgence of Stalin-like Soviet hostility was very unlikely for the next several years and that the Russian leaders had genuinely renounced most of the dangerous aspects of Stalin's policies and had adopted a pro-Tito position." By March, 1957 Tito found himself again resisting Soviet efforts to make him acknowledge the Kremlin's undisputed leadership of the Communist camp.

J.S.R.

HARKINS, WILLIAM E. *Dictionary of Russian Literature*. New York, Philosophical Library, 1956. 439 pp. \$10.00.

This is a useful reference work on Russian literature and its historical development. Besides en-

tries on individual authors, it treats the nineteenth-century social and political thinkers and contains essays by specialists on such topics as "Drama and Theater," "Soviet Literature," "Philosophy," and "Soviet Criticism." Concise, informative, and comprehensive in scope, this volume is superior to the existing reference works on the subject.

The Hungarian Situation and the Rule of Law. International Commission of Jurists. The Hague, Netherlands, 1957. 144 pp. Free on request.

The independent, world-wide association of lawyers located in The Hague (47, Buitenhof) seeks to promote the Rule of Law and to protect the individual from arbitrary government action. The above study is a collection of documents dealing with Soviet intervention in Hungary and drawing attention to the breaches of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary of 1947 and of the Geneva Convention of 1949. The resolution of a conference on the Hungarian situation, held at The Hague March 2, 1957, and sponsored by the Commission, was presented to the United Nations Committee on Hungary.

NAGY, IMRE. *In Defense of the New Course.* New York, Praeger, 1957. 306 pp. \$5.00.

The author is the well-known premier of Hungary during the October, 1956 revolution who had the courage to denounce the Warsaw pact and to declare Hungary independent and neutral. During his first premiership in 1953-1955, he introduced a number of liberal policies aimed at easing the stand-

ard of living of the masses, increasing the production of consumer goods, restricting the power of the political police, and granting greater freedom of thought. Denounced and deposed, he wrote, in 1955, what he called a "dissertation" in defense of his new course, addressing it to his former colleagues on the Central Committee and, indirectly, to the Kremlin leadership. The MS of this "dissertation" has been smuggled out of Hungary and published unabridged by Praeger. The book is an indictment of Communist policies similar to Milovan Djilas' *The New Class*, although Nagy, at the time, thought of himself as a faithful Communist and was not aware of the basic contradictions of Communist doctrine and practice which his argumentation clearly demonstrated.

ORNSTEIN, JACOB. *Slavic and East European Studies: Their Development and Status in the Western Hemisphere.* Washington, D.C. Department of State, External Research Staff, Office of Intelligence Research. 1957. 65 pp.

This paper provides up-to-date information on the status of Slavic studies in the United States. Specifically, it deals with the following: 1) major college and university centers where Russian, Eastern European, and non-Slavic languages of the U.S.S.R. are taught; 2) enrollments in these languages; 3) principal area programs, institutes, and research facilities devoted to Russia, East Europe, and Asiatic Russia; 4) strengths and weaknesses of the existing facilities and prospects for the future.

SZTANKAY, SOLTAN. *Christianity, Democracy and Technology*. New York, Philosophical Library, 1957. 182 pp. \$3.75.

The author of this book attempts to present in simple terms a few ideas which may help to overcome the challenge of Communism. In his opinion, Christianity engendered democracy, and democracy engendered technology. The latter is a great blessing; therefore, he advises us to cultivate its sources, democracy and Christianity.

While one can fully agree with the idea that Christianity and democracy should be cultivated, one can't approve the author's argumentation. Technology arose and developed prior to the spread of democracy, and the anti-Christian and anti-democratic Soviet Union has a highly developed technological establishment, as was recently demonstrated by the launching of the Sputnik. Moreover, for the author, Spengler's work, now forty years old, is the supreme source of wisdom, a view shared by few serious historians or sociologists of our day. It is a pity that the author has tried to achieve a laudable end with wholly inadequate means.

N.S.T.

ZALESKI, EUGENE. *Mouvements ouvriers et socialistes (Chronologie et Bibliographie)*. La Russie. Paris, Les Editions Ouvrières, 1956-1957. Vol. I, 463 pp., vol. II, 489 pp. 4.155 frs. for two volumes.

The two volumes list over 5,500 entries, in Russian and French translation, and cover not only the history of socialist and labor move-

ments in Russia but also practically all aspects of Russian history for the period 1725-1917, particularly the Russian revolutionary movement and Russian liberal thought. The material is arranged chronologically and is divided into six chapters. Each contains chronological tables and bibliographies.

Also included are two detailed indices, one covering the authors and editors of the publications listed, the other, the subject matter and the names of the leaders of the Russian revolutionary, liberal and labor movements.

The work's major limitation is the absence of data on the existing works and bibliographical guides in the field of Russian revolutionary and labor history. Despite this minor shortcoming, Mr. Zaleski's work is a major contribution to Russian bibliography and should meet with considerable success among students and scholars engaged in the field of East European history.

S.A.Z.

ZENKOVSKY, A. V. *Pravda o Stolypine (The Truth about Stolypin)*. New York, The author, 1957. 304 pp. \$4.00.

The author, Professor Alexander Zenkovsky, was in close association with Stolypin for many years. The above volume of reminiscences is based on a diary, kept by the author between 1906-1911 and on Stolypin's projected program of extensive reforms of Russian administration which the prime minister dictated to the author in May, 1911. This volume throws new light on Stolypin's plans for further develop-

ment of self-government in Russia, on his attitudes towards the political parties, his views on averting the World War and on friendly

cooperation with the United States. The book can be obtained at V. Anpolsky Books, 91 Fort Washington Ave., New York 32, N.Y.

Letter to the Editor

Dear Sir:

Dr. J. M. Meijer finds fault with my review of his book, *Knowledge and Revolution; The Russian Colony in Zurich (1870-1873)*, published in the April 1957 issue of *The Russian Review*. I am not alone in criticizing his book and for the same reasons, as, for example, the review of Professor Samuel H. Baron in the October 1957 issue of *The American Slavic and East European Review*, in which the latter concurs with me, for instance, that the proper translation of the Russian word *pop* is priest and not "pope," the Concise Oxford Dictionary notwithstanding.

Dr. Meijer's reliance on the authority of *The Great Soviet Encyclopedia* in his defense of rendering *raznochintsy* as "people of non-noble descent" (*The Encyclopedia of Brockhaus and Efron*, in his own admission, merely states that the term was "often contrasted with the nobility," which is another matter) and of his statement that Karakozov was tortured, is not worthy of a historian, nor is his reference, in the latter case, to a spurious and revolutionary publication of obvious propaganda intent. He admits that "both Shilov and Venturi make mention of contemporary rumors to the effect that Karakozov was tortured, and if both tend to the opinion that he was not, positive evidence for this is also lacking." Neither is there any "positive evidence" to affirm it. Hence my criticism of Dr. Meijer's statement that Karakozov was "probably tortured several times" as lacking any historical evidence is still valid. As to the use of the expression "white terror" following Karakozov's attempt,

it was again manufactured by the revolutionaries, and even Venturi qualifies it by the word "traditionally." Finally, I maintain that "the land is ours, but we are the tsar's" is a misquotation, notwithstanding its usage by Bakunin, because it makes no sense, since the majority of the serfs were owned by individual landowners and only a relatively few were crown serfs who could say "we are the tsar's." Furthermore in the saying "we are yours, but the land is ours" the emphasis is on "the land is ours," as such was the serfs' conviction. Last but not least, the statement that Karpovich's article published thirteen years ago was not available to European scholars is rather a lame excuse for having overlooked an important study.

LEONID I. STRAKHOVSKY

Toronto

November 20, 1957

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